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Abstract
This  thesis  argues that ‘Thatcherism’ was consistent with the 
values and interests of the Conservative party. The threat of 
socialism was pervasive and underpinned by the party’s socio-
economic base. The economic status of the middle class, under 
threat from inflation, pay controls, taxation, organised trade 
unions, and even comprehensive education, resulted in a 
strong emphasis on individual freedom. The free market, 
property, and choice, with their strong norm of methodological 
individualism, were the Thatcherite alternative. This 
strengthened those with skills  and qualifications but destroyed 
the collective structures that supported those without. 
Thatcherite historiography is  exercised most by intellectual high 
politics while the broader Conservative party has been 
neglected. However Thatcherism was a real political movement, 
not just the creation of metropolitan intellectuals and politicians. 
The grass-roots perspective offers a fuller and richer insight into 
the Thatcher revolution.
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4.
INTRODUCTION
Conservatism and Thatcherism
Despite its  place in Conservative party history, Thatcherism’s  place in 
Conservative thought has been disputed by scholars and commentators. Heath 
loyalist and Thatcher detractor Sir Ian Gilmour, described Thatcherism as ‘right-
wingery’,1 and like any right-wing system ‘merely reactionary or, simply, right-wing. 
It is not Conservative.’2  Peter Riddell claimed that ‘Both critics and supporters 
would be mistaken to regard Thatcherism as synonymous with Conservatism.’3 
The central aim of this thesis is to show that Thatcherism is synonymous with 
Conservatism and in harmony with the values of ordinary Conservatives.
  According to Anthony Seldon the remarkable thing about Thatcherism is that it 
‘came from outside the party’.4 He traces its origins to the neo-Liberal Mont Pelerin 
Society formed in the 1940s. Milton Friedman, a Mont Pelerin founder, famously 
suggested that Thatcher ‘was not in terms of belief a Tory’ but ‘a nineteenth-
century liberal’.5 Similarly Gilmour suggests that Thatcherism is largely ‘nineteenth-
5.
1 I. Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma (1992) p.8.
2 I. Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (1977) p.112.
3 P. Riddell, The Thatcher Government (1985) p.10.
4 A. Seldon, ʻConservative Centuryʼ, in Conservative Century, Ed. by A. Seldon and S. Ball (1994) p.
58.
5 The Observer, 29 Sept. 1982. 
century individualism dressed-up in twentieth-century clothes.’6  Some of 
Thatcher’s own comments support this view. In 1980 she spoke of her admiration 
for another founder of Mont Pelerin, Friedrich von Hayek. Speaking on the 
‘principles of Thatcherism’ in 1992, Thatcher cited both Professor Hayek and Sir 
Karl Popper. In the 1996 Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture she argued that ‘The kind 
of Conservatism which he and I favoured would be best described as ‘liberal’... 
And I mean the liberalism of Mr Gladstone not of the latter day collectivists.’7 Given 
this  outside influence, how important is the Conservative party in the development 
of Thatcherism?
 The election of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative party in 1975 
is  a useful starting point. The standard account of this  event underplays its 
ideological significance and gives the impression that Thatcherism started life 
outside the Conservative party.  Riddell argued that ‘Mrs Thatcher became leader 
of the Conservative Party in February 1975 principally because she was not 
Edward Heath, not because of a widespread commitment to her views.’ Hugo 
Young added that Heath’s  failure was  essentially ‘a personal not an ideological 
event.’  Most recently John Campbell has argued that ‘They voted for her primarily 
because she was not Ted Heath ... it was not a deliberate turning towards the 
right.’ 8 
6.
6 Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma, p.9.
7 M. Thatcher, Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, 11 Jan. 1996, Margaret Thatcher Foundation [online] 
Accessible at: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches (hereafter, Thatcher online archive).
8 Riddel, Thatcher, p.23; H. Young, One Of Us p.96 (1990); J. Campbell, Pistols at Dawn: Two 
hundred years of political rivalry (2009) p.323. For the ʻpersonalʼ account see also, P. Cosgrave, 
Margaret Thatcher: A Tory and her Party (1978); P. Jenkins, Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution (1989); A. 
Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State (1990); S. Jenkins, Thatcher & Sons: A Revolution 
in Three Acts (2006) p.46.
 This  ‘personal’ account has two key features. The first is that Thatcher’s vote 
was primarily a vote against Heath. His failure to allow a supporter to stand in the 
first round of the leadership contest meant that Thatcher benefited fully from 
disaffection with his leadership. The Thatcher team then deliberately downplayed 
their candidate’s chances to exploit anti-Heath feeling. The second feature is that 
Thatcher’s unexpected victory in the first round gave her unstoppable 
‘momentum’ in the second. This account is consistent with the recollections of 
some MPs. Reflecting on the contest Geoffrey Howe wrote, ‘Margaret had won 
above all because, like all the others, she wasn’t Ted - and, like none of the others, 
she had had the guts to offer her colleagues the choice.’9  While this  account is 
valuable and has strong anecdotal evidence in its  favour,10 it only partly explains 
the outcome. Ewen Green argues that there was more than contingency to 
Thatcher’s victory over Heath. Likewise, John Fair and John Hutchinson caution 
that ‘the importance of this  change of leadership in the Conservatives’ emerging 
ideological tradition cannot be understated.’11 
 Thatcher was the candidate for the Conservative right. Only after Keith Joseph 
and Edward Du Cann had ruled themselves out did she let her name go forward. 
Nigel Lawson reflects that he ‘broadly shared her political and (in particular) 
economic thinking’ and was ‘greatly relieved’ by her election.12  Alan Clark, ‘the 
7.
9 G. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (2008 edn.) p.93.
10 For a summary see, J. Campbell, Margaret Thatcher: The Grocerʼs Daughter (2000) p.301.
11 J. Fair, J. Hutchinson, ʻBritish Conservatism in the Twentieth Centuryʼ, in Albion, Vol.19 No.4 (Winter 
1987) p.567.
12 N. Lawson, The View From No.11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (1992) p.13.
maverick right-wing M.P’, was seen ‘rushing out of Westminster Hall shouting at 
the top of his voice, ‘she’s won, she’s won’.’13  Rhodes Boyson welcomed 
Thatcher’s election with a ‘sigh of relief’ and added that it was ‘important now to 
pursue some genuine right-wing policies.’14 Thatcher’s  affiliation is reflected on the 
left of the party. Edward Heath recalls that he appointed Thatcher to his shadow 
treasury team in 1974 in part to ‘disarm the right.’15 On Thatcher’s appointment 
Gilmour complained that there was ‘no reason in logic, history, philosophy or 
expediency, why the Tory Party should join the Labour party in moving towards the 
extremes.’16 
  These anecdotes suggest that Thatcher was strongly associated with the right. 
The results of a survey by Philip Cowley and Matthew Bailey of the way MPs voted 
in the contest reinforce the point. Of Thatcher’s 130 votes in the crucial first round 
about 75 can be attributed to the right of the party, while of Heath’s 119 votes 
70-80 can be attributed to the left. They conclude that ideology was a ‘key 
determinant’ in both rounds.17 John Campbell still reckons that the largest group of 
voters  could not be defined as left or right-wing. Yet Bailey and Cowley’s  figures 
suggest that 140-150 votes in the first round can be defined as left or right-wing 
with a smaller group of 126-136 that cannot. What is more, the group of left/right 
voters were almost split down the middle between Heath and Thatcher 
8.
13 J. Prior, A Balance of Power (1986) p.100.
14 Finchley Times, 14 Feb. 1975, Thatcher online archive.
15 E. Heath, The Course of My Life (1998) p.529.
16 Campbell, Pistols at Dawn, p.323.
17 P. Cowley, M. Bailey, ‘Peasants Uprising or Religious War?’ in British Journal of Political Science 
(Oct. 2000) p.628.
respectively. This makes claims such as Hugo Young’s that Thatcher ‘was  not 
elected as a right-winger’ difficult to sustain.18
  The ideological nature of the leadership contest challenges the view that 
Conservatism is  not an ideology.  According to Ian Gilmour ‘British Conservatism... 
is  not an ‘-ism’... Still less is it a system of ideas. It cannot be formulated in a series 
of propositions, which can be aggregated into a creed. It is not an ideology or a 
doctrine.’19 Another Heath loyalist, Francis Pym, argued that ‘If the main strength 
of Conservatism is adaptability, its main enemy is  ideology.’20  Historians  and 
political scientists  have frequently interpreted this hostility to ideology as  a lack of 
principle. According to Andrew Gamble, Conservatives are ‘renowned for their 
hostility to doctrine and their lack of principle.’21 
  Others are critical of this view. Brendon Evans and Andrew Taylor argue that 
the tendency to interpret pragmatism as a lack of ideology ‘is  a mistake’.22 Stuart 
Ball agrees. ‘It is a mistake to regard the Conservative party as driven only by a 
desire for power, or acting only on the basis of pragmatism and expediency. There 
is a clear relationship between different approaches ... and their underlying 
foundation of principles.’23  Political theorists have tried to articulate these 
9.
18 Young, One of Us, p.100.
19 Gilmour, Inside Right, p.121.
20 F. Pym, The Politics of Consent (1984) p.172. For this view see also, T. Russel, The Tory Party 
(Penguin, 1978); P. Walker, Staying Power (1991).
21 A. Gamble, ʻThatcherism and Conservative Politicsʼ, in The Politics of Thatcherism, Ed. by S. Hall 
and M. Jacques (1983) p.119.
22 B. Evans, A. Taylor, From Sailsbury to Major: Continuity and change in Conservative politics (1996) 
p.277.
23 S. Ball, The Conservative Party since 1945 (1998) p.162 (My own italics). 
principles. W.H Greenleaf suggested ‘libertarianism’ and ‘paternalism’ as possible 
underlying principles, and Norman Barry distinguishes between ‘dispositional’ and 
‘substantive’ Conservatism.24
  The Historian Ewen Green believed that ‘Ideology, as it is for all political 
parties, is  central to the history of the Conservative party.’25  He finds that 
Greenleaf’s division between libertarians and paternalists  fails  to account for times 
when Conservatives  have held libertarian and paternalist views simultaneously. 
Instead Green adopts Martin Seliger’s terminology.26  Conservatism has a set 
‘fundamental’ positions that underly a range of ‘operative’ positions, with the latter 
shifting in response to political reality. John Barnes makes a similar distinction. He 
suggests that Conservative ideology operates on two levels, the first being the Tory 
‘facts of life’ which the Conservative views as  common-sense politics, and the 
second being the deployment of a further set of related ideas.27
  In the ‘Politics of Imperfection’ Anthony Quinton offers three fundamental 
positions: traditionalism, organicism and political scepticism, related to each other 
by the concept of human intellectual and moral imperfection.28  Throughout the 
twentieth century Green confirms ‘a marked adherence to the closely related 
tenets of intellectual imperfection and political scepticism’.29  It follows that 
10.
24 See also, N. OʼSullivan, Conservatism (1976), R. Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (1980).
25 E.H.H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (2001) p.14.
26 Ibid. p.280.
27 J. Barnes, ʻIdeology and Factionsʼ, in Conservative Century, p.318.
28 A. Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection (1977) p.17.
29 Green, Ideologies, p.283.
Conservatives prefer experience and practice as  a guide to political action rather 
than abstract theory. The twentieth-century conservative thinker Michael Okashott, 
wrote that ‘politics is  the pursuit of intimations, not of a dream or general 
principle.’30 From a historical perspective Lord Blake observed the Conservatives’ 
sceptical attitude towards Utopian panaceas, international idealism and the 
goodness of human nature, and his belief in the continuity of institutions and 
traditions.31 
  Although Thatcherism was influenced by Mont Pelerin, its influence was at the 
operative rather than the fundamental level. Firstly, this was not the first time 
Conservatives had been influenced by neo-liberalism. Secondly, the Thatcherites 
never fully embraced it. And thirdly, when neo-liberal language or policies were 
adopted they were defended on Conservative rather than neo-liberal grounds. 
Andrew Taylor suggests  that the role of neo-liberalism is  best understood as  a ‘tool 
not a blueprint’, and fashioned in a way conditioned by British Conservatism.32 For 
instance Nigel Lawson justified the Thatcher government’s market reforms by 
arguing that free markets were truthful about man’s intellectual and moral limits, 
whereas state intervention tries to achieve too much.33 
  Green acknowledges that even at the operative level consolidating neo-
liberalism with Conservatism is not without its  problems. For instance, the market 
11.
30 Ibid. p.94.
31 R. Blake, The Conservative Party: From Peel to Major (1998) p.414.
32 Evans & Taylor, From Sailsbury to Major, p.239.
33 Lawson, View from No.11, Annexe I, p.1040-1046.
‘can be deemed guilty of intellectual imperfection’ itself.34 However it is  important to 
point out that the Thatcherites did not see the market as perfect. Lawson was 
explicit that ‘markets  are undoubtedly imperfect’. Rather, by the 1970s the 
imperfections of the state were considered the greater evil. Lawson adds, ‘So far 
from ever more state intervention being justified by virtue of the admitted 
imperfections of the market, a greater reliance on markets  is  justified by virtue of 
the practical imperfections of state intervention.’35 Earlier in 1974 Thatcher argued, 
‘...we are not and never have been a party of ‘laissez faire’ ... But we do believe 
that the Government's overall responsibility for the nation's well-being must be 
exercised in harmony with the working of market forces. Otherwise the 
contradictions and distortions created make the best—intentioned policies counter-
productive.’36 This  explains the operative shift to neo-liberal economics during the 
1980s, and it bears out Lord Hailsham’s argument in 1951 that ‘laissez-faire 
economics were never orthodox Conservative teaching and Conservatives have 
only begun to defend them when there appears  to be a danger of society swinging 
too far to the other extreme.’37 
  If society was swinging too far to the left, then those who most strongly 
identified themselves as  Conservatives must have been calling for a restatement 
of principles and a change of policy. Green argues that they were. ‘In terms of 
contextualizing Thatcherism, the ideas, arguments and prejudices of the middle 
12.
34 Green, Ideologies, p.288.
35 Lawson, View from No.11, Annexe I. p.1046.
36 Thatcher, The Daily Telegraph, 1 July 1974, Thatcher online archive.
37 Visct. Hailsham, The Conservative Case, (1959 edn.) p.133.
and lower ranks of the Conservative party provide a route to understanding the 
‘popular’ origins.’38  Thatcher herself certainly believed that it was their views she 
was representing. In 1975 Thatcher she told the Conservative Conference at 
Blackpool that ‘We shall not have to convert people to our principles. They will 
simply rally to those which truly are their own.’39
  Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Jeremy Richardson, conclude from their 1992 
survey of Conservative members that the Thatcherites  failed in their programme to 
‘re-educate’ the party which remained ‘rather anti-Thatcherite’. This is a valuable 
insight into the Conservative party of the 1990s. However, in so far as it gives an 
insight into what the membership thought in the 1970s, its conclusions are 
retrospective. The authors do concede an ‘absence of data on grass  roots beliefs 
prior to Mrs Thatcher’s  premiership’, which seems a good opportunity for an 
historical inquiry. 40 
  Historians have tended to study the Conservative party from a high political or 
‘historical’ perspective. Its form is  chronological and tends to focus on the 
leadership or principal Conservative politicians, neglecting the wider party.41 While 
political scientists have largely confined their studies to policy making, in the 1950s 
and 1960s local studies into voting patterns and studies into working class 
13.
38 E.H.H. Green, Thatcher (2006) p.40.
39 Thatcher at Harrogate, 15 Mar. 1975, Thatcher online archive.
40 P. Whiteley, P. Seyd, J. Richardson, True Blues (1994) p.158.
41 See, N. Gash, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965 (1977); R. Blake, The 
Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (1987); J. Ramsden, An Appetite for Power: A History of the 
Conservative Party since 1830 (1998); A. Clark, The Tories: Conservatives and the Nation State 
1922-1997 (1999).
Conservative support offer a partial insight into Conservative society.42 However, 
by in large the party rank-and-file have been neglected by scholars.
 In a rare early study into Conservative opinion Mike Wilson collated motions to 
the party conference from 1945 to 1973, and examined whether there was a 
correlation between rank-and-file attitudes and Thatcherism.43  He divides 
Conservative opinion into four categories, libertarian (right), libertarian (left), 
collectivist (right), and collectivist (left), and then breaks  down motions along these 
ideological fault lines. On issues such as taxation, public expenditure, 
nationalisation, property ownership, and trade unions, Wilson concludes  that the 
libertarian (right) have played a major role since the end of the war. This is 
especially true during periods of economic difficulty. For instance in 1956 and 
1957, the number of motions to conference on ‘economic management’ increased 
from 54 in 1955 to 122 in 1957, before falling back to 53 in 1958. The number of 
these that came from the libertarian (right) also increased from 29 in 1955 to 61 in 
1957, before falling back to 31 in 1958. A similar preoccupation with economic 
matters from a libertarian (right) perspective occurred again in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (also years of economic difficulty). This would seem to pre-empt 
Thatcherite economic policy. John Ramsden, followed by Stuart Ball and N.J 
Crowson, have pioneered research into grass-roots opinion, utilising local and 
national archive material. Ramsden’s research into rank-and-file discontent with 
14.
42 For the former see, J. Blondel, ʻThe Conservative Association and the Labour Party in Reading, in 
Political Studies, 6 (1958); and for the later see, F. Parkin, ʻWorking-class Conservativesʼ, in British 
Journal of Sociology, 18 (1967).
43 M. Wilson, ʻGrass-roots Conservatismʼ, in The British Right, Ed. by R. King and N. Nugent (1977).
Edward Heath’s leadership, seems to reinforce Wilson’s earlier findings on the 
prominence of libertarian attitudes. 
 Increasing scholarly interest in the party rank-and-file has been justified by a 
number of historians who have pioneered this research. The conventional 
understanding of the party as a ‘monarchical’ model with the leader and close 
advisors exerting executive control, was established by Robert McKenzie44. To an 
extent this  remains the case. As Barnes and Cockett concede, ‘Nothing becomes 
Conservative policy without the assent of the leader.’45  However, this needs 
qualification. Nicholas  Crowson argues that ‘this  classical analysis of the party 
structure places too great a stress upon the written constitution’. In reality the party 
leadership is subject to ‘unwritten constraints’.46  Barnes suggests that the party 
membership can ‘set the bounds beyond which the leadership dare not go.’47 
Significantly for the study of the Conservative party and Thatcherism, Ball argues 
that the rank-and-file ‘do manifest and mould party attitudes, which were often the 
precursor of policy.’48  Whitely, Seyd and Richardson agree, ‘party members 
provide an input that should not be ignored, and facilitate the process whereby 
ideas get onto the agenda of public concern.’49
15.
44 R. McKenzie, British Political Parties (1964).
45 J. Barnes, R. Cockett, ʻThe Making of Party Policyʼ, in Conservative Century, p.347.
46 N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators 1935-1940 
(1997) pp.198, 317.
47 J. Barnes, R. Cockett, ʻThe Making of Party Policyʼ, in Conservative Century, p.347.
48 S. Ball, ʻThe National and regional party structureʼ, ibid. p.219.
49 Whitely, Seyd & Richardson, True Blues, p.7.
 This thesis is about the development of Thatcherism in grass-roots 
Conservative politics. The first chapter discussed three themes within 
Conservative politics that guide the response to the ‘failure’ of the Heath 
government in the 1970s and the party’s approach post-1975. The second chapter 
will look at economic concerns  of the party’s  core constituency. Through a 
combination of economic forces and government policy, their relative financial 
rewards were under pressure. This was reflected in rank-and-file protest over 
inflation, taxation, the ability of trade unions to secure above inflation wage 
settlements, and later their ability to secure exemptions from pay controls. The 
final chapter will deal with concepts such as the free market, private ownership, 
and freedom of choice, with their strong strong norm of methodological 
individualism.
 In terms of source material, the main input will be unpublished constituency 
correspondence between 1970 and 1979 held at the Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford. These have wide geographical scope and provide a good cross-section of 
the party organisation. There are the views of ordinary members, local officers, 
agents, and communication between agents, Members  of Parliament and the party 
headquarters. The latter manuscripts show that Conservative Central Office were 
directly informed of events unfolding at the local level. Their major limitation is that 
the views expressed by some constituency associations are predictable given the 
views of their Members of Parliament. One example is Oswestry represented by 
the right-wing John Biffen. However, this is not the case for all the material and 
where it is  it cannot be assumed that the Member of Parliament is  always  driving 
16.
local opinion. The Conservative Agent’s Journal is  consulted to get the perspective 
of this important strata of the party organisation. Most of these issues are occupied 
with administrative questions, but there are some useful extracts. At the local level, 
club magazines  are valuable. They are limited in the respect that editorials provide 
only the views of one person. However, when members  of various organisational 
importance are drawing on the same themes, then they provide a valuable insight. 
For a more formal measure of grass-roots opinion, motions submitted to the party 
conference are used in a supportive role. General shifts of opinion are clearly 
perceptible in these, particularly between 1973 and 1975. There was no 
conference in 1973 and so the differences of opinion between 1973 and 1975 are 
quite stark. The wider media is consulted including The Times, The Daily 
Telegraph and The Political Quarterly. Finally, the prodigious archival work of John 
Ramsden, Stuart Ball, Ewen Green and others, is used to support the research 
presented in the following chapters. 
17.
 
I. 
THEMES
Thatcherism is often seen as a reaction to the events of the 1970s. The electoral 
failure of the Heath government led to overwhelming calls  in the party for a change 
of direction. More broadly the end of the post-war boom and rampant inflation, or 
‘stagflation’, discredited conventional economic wisdom. Rising prices served as a 
recruiting agent for trade unionism, and the strike was increasingly used to obtain 
real wage increases. According to Norman Barry the emergence of Thatcherism 
‘was not originally an ideological conversion but more a response to events.’1 
Kenneth Minogue agrees that ‘the real context of Thatcherism are to be found ... in 
the 1970s.’2 
 This chapter suggests that while the context of this decade are indeed
crucial, there were long-standing themes in Conservative politics that guided the 
party’s reaction. Firstly, the threat of ‘socialism’. Secondly, the emergence of 
individualism. And third, the expansion of the middle class, which served to 
enhance the electoral viability of a more atomistic settlement. These themes, 
extant  since at least 1945, reached a head in the 1970s. The Heath government’s 
u-turns were the final straw, resulting in unusually high levels of internal party 
protest. 
19.
1 N. Barry, ʻNew Rightʼ, in The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Ed. by 
K.Hickson (2005) p.34.
2 K. Minogue, M. Biddis, Thatcherism (1987) xii.
  In their survey on the ideological evolution of the Conservative party, John Fair 
and John Hutcheson show that party literature reveals a growing recognition of 
socialism as ‘the principal force to be reckoned with’.3  In 1912 Hugh Cecil 
compared the threat presented by socialism to that of Jacobinism a century before. 
He wrote that in both movements there is  ‘a reckless disregard of private rights’ 
and ‘a disposition, not gradually to develop one state of society out of another, but 
to make a clean sweep of institutions in the interest of half-thought-out reform’.4 In 
the inter-war years, socialism resumed its  role as the party bogeyman. Professor 
F.J.C Hearnshaw wrote about the ‘menace of socialism’,5 and Lord Halifax thought 
that the Conservative party was its only effective opponent.6  In 1946 Harold 
Macmillan called for an alliance against socialists. ‘The great dividing line’, he 
wrote, ‘is between those who believe in the prime socialist dogma, and those who 
see in such a development the grim nightmare of the totalitarian state.’7 
  The enhanced clarity of Conservative policy during this period owed much to 
the socialist threat. Defeat at the 1906 general election underscored the need for 
the Conservatives to develop a distinct agenda. In 1910 the Fifth Earl of 
Malmesbury called for ‘some philosophical writer of genius’ to lay down the 
foundations for Conservative policy.8  Others  were less  enthusiastic. In a chapter 
20.
3 J. Fair, J. Hutchinson, ʻBritish Conservatism in the Twentieth Centuryʼ, in Albion, Vol.19, No.4 (Winter 
1987) p.551.
4 Ibid. p.549.
5 Ibid. p.559.
6 Ibid. p.556.
7 The Times, 16 Sept. 1946.
8 Fair & Hutchinson, ʻBritish Conservatismʼ, p.552.
entitled ‘The Problem with a Programme’, Hearnshaw argued that the more 
Conservatism was defined in terms of a programme the more rigid and less 
Conservative it sounded. In The Middle Way, published in 1938, Harold Macmillan 
tried to consolidate the need for programme politics with Conservatism. It sought to 
combine Conservative scepticism of ideology with a balance between laissez-faire 
individualism and socialist command economy. In practice it included the use of 
demand management techniques to create economic conditions conducive with 
high employment, industrial re-organisation to increase economic output, and 
nationalisation in clear instances of market failure. It became the basis for the 
Conservative party’s acceptance of the state’s enlarged remit after 1945. 
 However, by the 1970s the middle-way seemed a hopelessly inadequate 
bulwark against socialism. Keith Joseph argued that the ‘middle way’ had replaced 
the usual ‘pendulum’ between left and right with a ‘ratchet’ whereby the socialists 
moved it forward ‘as  fast as they considered politic’ and Conservative governments 
‘either kept things as  they were, or let them move on under their own momentum.’9 
He termed this process the ‘ratchet effect’.  Angus Maude expressed the same 
concern. Rebuking Ian Gilmour in The Times, Maude wrote that ‘Whatever the 
results of elections, it is only what the left does when in power that remains 
permanent.’10 Rhodes Boyson’s ‘slow-quick-quick-slow foxtrot to socialism’ tapped 
into the same theme.11
21.
9 J. Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath 1957-1975 (1996), p.421.
10 The Times, 7 May 1974.
11 Ramsden, Winds, p.421.
 At the parliamentary level the critique of the middle-way resonated. Terrence 
Higgins, the M.P for Worthing, warned his constituents that ‘if on coming to office 
we merely occupied ‘the middle ground’ and adopted a policy of moderation, we 
shall inevitably find over the years a ratchet effect which takes our national policies 
on every issue further to the left.’12 Jill Knight, the M.P for Edgbaston, argued that 
‘we shall never beat the socialists with policies that are wishy-washy pale-lilac 
versions of socialism.’13 Hugh Fraser, the M.P for Stafford and Stone, argued that 
recent failings were not just those of socialism but ‘the failure of consensus 
politics.’ He argued that ‘the so-called centre was proving a political morass’, and 
called for the party to ‘make their traditional stand.’14  Philip Vander Elst, the 
Editorial Director of the Conservative Selsdon Group, wrote that Britain had 
‘steadily become more socialist despite the fact that Tory governments  have held 
office for most of the past 40 years.’15 
 At the grass-roots  level, East Leicester strongly urged the next Conservative 
government to ‘reverse the trend of socialism.’16  At the 1974 Annual Women’s 
Conference, Esher members called for the principles of Conservatism to be ‘re-
examined in order to produce true Conservatism and not watered-down 
socialism.’17  Aldershot Conservatives argued that it would be impossible for the 
22.
12 T. Higgins, Worthing Courier, Spring 1978, CPA/Box 7/Constituency Correspondence, S/E Area, 
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party to represent all the people ‘in a progressively left-wing environment’, and 
called for ‘the next Conservative government to redress  the balance by the 
cancellation of extreme left-wing policies.’18  On the eve of the 1979 general 
election, an editorial questioned, ‘Will we move towards a freer, more democratic 
society, or will we be just delaying the inevitable slide to socialism and communism 
like we have done in the past?’19  
 In consequence there was a noticeable move to the right. In 1976 Gillingham 
Conservatives observed that it was ‘undeniable that constituency opinion has 
moved towards the right in the past year.’20 One member at West Gloucestershire 
called for the party to be ‘more vociferous and more right-wing.’21  In 1974 
Oswestry members criticised the shadow cabinet, and suggested the replacement 
of Edward Heath as leader by Keith Joseph, who the association described as ‘the 
only success  in our last government.’ They also suggest the promotion of right-
wing Conservatives such as John Biffen, Edward Du Cann and Angus Maude to 
the shadow cabinet, and call for Edward Heath to work with Enoch Powell ‘for the 
good of the party and the country.’22 
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 Even after Thatcher’s election as leader, criticism was still directed at left-
inclined Conservatives. In 1976 West Gloucestershire complained that ‘front-bench 
spokesmen were not voicing credible alternatives to socialist policies’.  Specifically 
criticism was leveled at the ‘lack of team behind the leader rather than the leader 
herself’. One member felt that a change in Thatcher’s team was ‘long overdue’, 
and there was further criticism of the Heathite loyalist Reginald Maudling.23 From 
West Gloucestershire at least, there would have been some satisfaction when in 
November Maudling was removed from post.
Labour policies such as the Industry Act with its combination of public ownership 
and state direction, affirmed Conservative fears. At Upminster Keith Joseph argued 
that Britain had had ‘too much Socialism’,24 and in Thatcher claimed that she was 
out to destroy it.25   Further down the party West Gloucestershire Conservatives 
declared that ‘destroying Socialism was vital’, and urged Socialist bills  to be fought 
‘clause by clause’.26  In 1977, Hove Conservatives referred to the ‘menace of 
socialist dogma’.27  The fight against socialism was often Churchillian in rhetoric. 
Folkestone and Hythe Association declared that ‘Upon us as  Conservatives has 
fallen the task of fighting for our country in a way that it has never been fought for 
before. Socialism must be fought at every turn.’28
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 Anti-socialist feeling amongst Conservative voters was recognized by the party 
hierarchy. A Steering Committee report circulated in May 1978 suggested that ‘the 
terms Labour and socialist should be used interchangeably so as to rub off onto 
each other.’  The same report recommended that the party ‘link the general British 
sickness to Labour government policies and to the socialist beliefs from which 
these policies derive’. Determined to destroy socialism, they recognised the need 
for a ‘substantial anti-socialist mandate.’29 
 In the 1970s the menace of socialism resulted in a strong assertion of 
individual rights. In fact the threat to individual freedom had been central to the 
rights’ critique of socialism since the late nineteenth century. In Social Equality 
(1882) and The Limits of Pure Democracy (1919), William Mallock railed against 
the pursuit of equality. He argued that individual ingenuity underlay social 
progress. ‘Labour in itself’, he argued, ‘is no more the cause of wealth than 
Shakespeare’s pen was the cause of writing Hamlet.’ Ingenuity could not be 
redistributed by legislation but it could be disincentivised by the pursuit of equality 
and excessive wealth redistribution.30  In The Middle-Way Macmillan virtually 
makes the same point. ‘Human beings, widely various in their capacity, character, 
talent and ambition, tend to differentiate at all times and in all places. To deny 
them the right to differ, to enforce economic and social uniformity upon them, is to 
throttle one of the most powerful and creative of human appetites.’31
25.
29 C.Patten, ʻImplementing Our Strategyʼ, 21 Dec. 1977, CPA/SC/16/62.
30 J.Barnes, ʻIdeology and Factionsʼ, in Conservative Century, Ed. by A. Seldon and S. Ball (1994) p.
334.
31 H. Macmillan, The Middle Way (1966 edn.) xviii.
 In the post-war period the party started to construct an electoral appeal around 
individual freedom.  In 1945 Winston Churchill argued that ‘liberty in all its forms is 
challenged by the fundamental conceptions of socialism.’32  Labour’s landslide 
victory and Churchill’s surprise resignation, forced the Conservative party to 
accept many of the Attlee government’s collectivist reforms. However, the 
individual was resurrected in 1950. The party manifesto, This is the Road, called 
for ‘the encouragement of enterprise and initiative’, and included pledges to 
‘Reduce Taxation’, ‘Limit Controls’, and ‘Stop Nationalisation’.33 
 The 1959 general election is a significant point in the development of an 
individualist programme. In The Conservative Case, re-published in the run-up to 
the election, Lord Hailsham argued that Conservatives regarded themselves in the 
twentieth century as the ‘true champions of liberty.’ ‘The danger’, Hailsham wrote, 
was now ‘not too much but too little freedom.’34  During the campaign Heathcote 
Amory, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told a rally in North Cornwall that the 
supreme issue in the election was ‘a choice between freedom and opportunity and 
the all-pervading power of a bureaucratic Socialist Sate.’35 To some extent rhetoric 
was reflected in party literature. Onward in Freedom called for ‘fresh winds of 
freedom and opportunity’ and trumpeted the party’s  success in removing from ‘the 
trader, the farmer, the businessman, and the private citizen the whole socialist 
paraphernalia of burdensome and complex controls.’36  Later Sir Alec Douglas 
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Home went so far as to say that ‘individuality is the hallmark of the Conservative 
philosophy.’37
 The emerging critique of the middle-way renewed the need for a distinct 
programme. The Political Discussion Group at West Gloucestershire, argued that 
‘Destroying socialism is vital but we must have an alternative to put in its place.’ 
While ‘socialist dogma had an obvious immediate appeal’, ‘Conservatism should 
have something more attractive to offer.’38 The obvious fall-back was individual 
freedom, expressed with greater clarity after 1975. Shortly after becoming leader 
Thatcher looked back to Churchill’s 1950 campaign for inspiration. She 
proclaimed, ‘The greatest Conservative Prime Minister of this Century, Winston 
Churchill, once had as his slogan: Set the People Free. It is time we revived it.’39 
 At the grass-roots level the shift to individual rights is clear. In 1974 the North/
West area C.P.C published a report entitled The individual in society. It states, ‘The 
theme of individualism has long been a major strand in Conservative thought. It 
seems especially relevant to the current period of fresh policy making in the light of 
accelerating trends towards collectivism.’40  In the same year Aldershot 
Conservatives called for ‘a cancellation of extreme left-wing policies and the 
adoption of measures which will restore freedom of individual choice and action.’41 
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At a meeting of the North/West area Women’s Finance and General Purposes 
Committee, members called for policies to ‘encourage individuals’ as a ‘bulwark 
against the encroachment of Government and bureaucracy. White Hall does not 
know best.’42  East Grinstead members called for a simple ‘restatement of the 
party’s belief in personal freedom, independence and responsibility.’43
 The shift away from collectivism and towards individualism was  helped by the 
expanding middle class and their mounting frustration with post-war the settlement. 
That the Conservative party was increasingly drawn from the ranks of this  socio-
economic group helped manoeuvre the Conservative party into an position based 
on the rights  and responsibilities of individuals. The expanding middle class, 
sometimes called the new middle class, first appeared in Conservative politics 
during the 1950s and started to put pressure on the Conservative establishment to 
‘set them free’. 
 In October 1957 Harold Macmillan wrote a note to Michael Fraser, the party’s 
chief research officer, which reads, ‘I am always hearing about the middle classes. 
What is it they really want? Can you put it down on a sheet of notepaper, and I will 
see whether we can give it to them?’44 It was penned during the so-called middle-
class revolt. Inflation, pay freezes, high taxation and working class trade unionism, 
were pushing down on middle-class  income differentials. From mid-1956 Rab 
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Butler was being warned about the frustration of the ‘oppressed middle classes’.45 
At the 1956 party conference there were calls for ‘drastic measures’ to defend the 
‘harassed middle class.’  Ewen Green has studied the emergence of middle-class 
protest groups such as the Middle Class Alliance, which the party hierarchy saw as 
a manifestation of ‘genuine disaffection within a social grouping that was normally 
regarded as a core element of the Conservative constituency.’46 
 In by-elections the loss of Tunbridge Wells in 1956, Torquay, Edinburgh, 
Ipswich and Lewisham north in 1957, Torrington in 1958, and famously Orpington 
in 1962, were a embarrassing for the party leadership. Subsequent elections at 
Middlesbrough West, Stockton-on-Tees, Derby North, Montgomeryshire and West 
Derbyshire, all showed a collapse in Conservative support. At the same time the 
Liberals were making significant gains at the local level. From 1959 to 1962 the 
number of Liberal councillors increased from 475 to 1,603. ‘Most of these gains’, 
Ken Young points  out, ‘were made in the south of England, and predominantly in 
the home counties’. He adds that ‘relative success in the suburbs and poor 
performance in the cities  seemed to be the pattern.’47 As at the national level the 
Liberals were making in-roads into the Conservative heartlands. Macmillan’s 
response was dismissive. In the wake of Orpington he concluded that 
‘Conservative voters abstained, or voted Liberal as a by-election protest against 
29.
45 Ibid. p.223.
46 Ibid. p.193-194.
47 K. Young, ʻOrpington and the Liberal revivalʼ, in By-elecions in British Politics, Ed. by C. Cook and J. 
Ramsden (2007) p.158.
some of the things they don’t like, some things they don’t understand, and some 
things where perhaps they are not patient enough to look to the end.’48 
 There is a sense of déjà vu about the 1970s. The Middle Class Association 
(MCA) was founded in 1975, expanding from 650 to 5,000 members. It merged 
with the National Association for Freedom later the same year, whose newspaper 
The Free Nation reached a circulation of some 30,000 by 1976. The founder of the 
MCA, Conservative M.P John Gorst, argued that ‘the middle class, if pushed too 
far, would spontaneously erupt.’49 The M.P William Clark, himself connected to the 
MCA, argued that ‘for too long the middle classes have shouldered a higher and 
higher proportion of the cost of running the country’, adding ‘enough is enough’.50 
These organisations were short-lived, as they were in the 1950s, but they did show 
an ‘increased willingness of certain sections of an undeniably fragmented class to 
organise in the 1970s as to protect their interests.’51 
 Unlike Macmillan, Thatcher was  keen to identify herself and her political 
values with the middle class. She objected to those who ‘sneered’ at the middle 
class and believed that the party’s ‘grandees’ were overwhelmed by a sense of 
guilt towards the poor. During the 1975 leadership campaign Thatcher countered, 
‘if "middle class values" include the encouragement of variety and individual 
choice, the provision of fair incentives and rewards for skill and hard work, the 
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maintenance of effective barriers against the excessive power of the State and a 
belief in the wide distribution of individual private property, then they are certainly 
what I am trying to defend.’52 Her class association was reflected by her political 
rivals. Ian Gilmour warned Conservatives against retiring ‘behind a privet hedge 
into a world of narrow class interests and selfish concerns.’53  Julian Critchley 
warned against becoming the party ‘of the aggrieved motorist.’54
 However, the term ‘middle class’, although often used in literature on 
Thatcherism, needs clarifying. The ‘haute bourgeoisie’ or the middle class elites 
were not the usual agitators. Roger King argues that it was the traditional middle 
class, ‘the petit bourgeoisie and the independent professional’ who had ‘long been 
alienated ... squeezed between the millstones of big business and powerful trade 
unions.’55 It was this group that Thatcher sought to represent. Thatcher distrusted 
‘upper middle-class intellectuals’ who could not be depended on to defend middle 
class values. Her contempt for these ‘traitors’ or ‘quislings’ is evident. John 
Campbell writes that Thatcher was  ‘an unabashed warrior on behalf of her class’, 
that is to say ‘the lower and middling middle class’ or ‘our people’.56 To an extent 
the skilled working class were also part of this group.
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 This  middling strata of society was often referred to as those ‘in the middle’. 
The Chairman of Mayfield Branch, East Grinstead, argued that ‘The poor, those 
represented by strong trade unions, and the wealthy, all did well under the 
Conservatives but those “in the middle” did less  well.’ The secretary for Hadlow 
Branch called for an appeal to the ‘in betweens’.57 In a study-paper produced by 
North West CPA in 1975, particular attention was paid to owner occupiers, new 
town dwellers, teachers, doctors, nurses, shopkeepers, and also housewives and 
council house tenants. These were the type of people that made-up the ‘middle’ 
strata. A member of Leek conservatives  wrote to Mrs Thatcher in August 1976 
calling for ‘the middle strata of the British population, such as the house-owners, 
middle management, professional classes and upper working class, to be 
represented by some form of association or organisation to protect their interests’, 
which were ‘undoubtedly being eroded.’58 
 By-election defeats in Berwick-upon-Tweed, Ripon, Isle of Ely, and Sutton and 
Cheam,  reminiscent of the 1950s, were demonstrations of their disillusion. The 
South-East deputy agent explained that there were parallels between Orpington in 
1962 and Sutton and Cheam in 1973. Both contained a ‘high percentage of 
commuters of middle and lower executive and professional types who will never 
vote socialist but feel disappointed with the present government.’ As in the 1950s, 
this  group found their differentials  squeezed by trade union bargaining power and 
government policy. The letter continues, ‘Worried by rising prices, rates, season 
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tickets, they show resentment at the success achieved by militant industrial trade 
unions and feel let down.’ ‘They are the “ones in the middle” that you and I 
discussed before the election.’59  The C.P.C Officer in East Grinstead suggested 
that those in the middle ‘found themselves overtaken in the wages stakes’, and 
‘from frustration deserted the Conservative Party.’60 
 They fueled the Liberal revival of the mid-1970s. The agent for Oswestry wrote 
to the area Chairman for the West Midlands warning of ‘a strong liberal 
challenge.’61 The Chairman of Mayfield suggested that it was  from people ‘in the 
middle’ that the Liberals were gaining support.62  The South East deputy agent 
explained that this  group were ‘easy meat for a liberal candidate.’63 In May 1974, 
the North West area agent wrote to central office warning that ‘the Liberal revival 
had not abated and that in some areas they were maintaining and strengthening 
their position.’64 In 1977 Canterbury Conservatives lamented, ‘It is only thanks to 
the Liberal party and its temporary supporters in 1974 that we had a Labour 
government in power at all.’65
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 This  socio-economic group were increasingly powerful within the party itself. In 
1973 Julian Critchley wrote about ‘the embourgeoisement of the Conservative 
party in the House of Commons, and beyond it.’ The constituency associations 
were becoming ‘increasingly petit-bourgeois’ he complained, ‘now judging 
supplicant’s speeches not so much by volume as  by content’. ‘They are interested 
not simply in ritual condemnation of the policies of the rival parties, but in the 
political nuances... Will the candidate reflect their anxieties and prejudices? Is he a 
member of the Monday Club? Where does he stand in the Conservative 
coalition?”66 At the parliamentary level Ewen Green observes that ‘The presence of 
the ‘knights  of the shires’, military, and other public servants declined, and they 
were replaced by representatives of the salaried, professional middle classes.’67 
This registered with the more established Conservatives. Douglas Hurd 
complained about the ‘typical Thatcherite - dark-suited, articulate, 55, accountant, 
full of sourness.’ The following day he wrote, ‘Quick sandwich in Pembroke and 
talk on devolution to PEST (left-inclined Conservative students) - a lively admirable 
group. These are the people who must win the party, not stiff-collared accountants 
from Stratford on Avon.’68
 In 1970 there was hope that the Heath government would succeed in 
reversing the ratchet where their predecessors had failed. Heath was working 
class, had fought his way to Oxford, Parliament and Downing Street, and thus 
supposed to understand the ambitious, hard-working middle class. He promised a 
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better Britain, to change the course of the nation’s  history. Green argues that the 
general election of 1970 was seen ‘by a powerful body of Conservative opinion as 
the climax of a twenty-five year battle against not only the Labour party’s socialism, 
but the quasi-socialism represented by their own party’s failure to dismantle the 
‘post-war settlement’.69 Regardless of the Heath leadership’s true intentions, they 
were certainly complicit in the perception that they intended to reverse the ‘ratchet’. 
For instance in 1968 Anthony Barber, then Chairman of the party, tapped into rank 
and file frustration:
As each new socialist bill  is steam-rolled through the House of Commons, as ministers heap 
onto their civil  servants new functions which even they cannot understand, so our opposition 
sometimes seems to be almost wholly in vain, and our protests to no avail.70 
 The 1970 manifesto expressed the party’s  intent to ‘clear away from Whitehall 
a great load of tasks which have accumulated under socialism; to hand back 
responsibilities wherever we can to the individual, to the family, to private initiative, 
to the local authority, to the people.’71  At the 1970 Conservative Conference 
Edward Heath famously determined ‘to change the course of the history of this 
nation.’72 This  tapped into the same rank and file frustration with ‘socialist’ policies 
that Thatcher would tap into five years later. Ian Gilmour concedes that any 
‘assumption’ of a move to the right were ‘largely the leadership’s own fault.’73 The 
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perceived move to the right is  reflected in a letter published in the Conservative 
Agent’s Journal: 
As a rather old-fashioned Conservative I joined the Monday Club in 1963 as I believed it to be 
necessary to offset the then somewhat left-wing influence of the Bow Group. The aim, I 
sincerely think, was achieved as in 1970 the country elected what is, to my mind, a truely 
Conservative government. By that time I had ceased to belong to the Monday Club since it had 
suffered the fate of all  ginger groups once the object for which they are set-up has been 
achieved.74
 Specifically the 1970 Manifesto pledged to reduce government spending, cut 
tax, ‘disengage’ from industry, and abandon pay policies. On each of these issues 
the party leadership transgressed while in government. Green contends that ‘For 
those in the party, in both the upper and lower echelons, who had their hopes and 
expectations raised in 1970, the disappointment of 1972-4 was all too palpable.’75 
To make matters worse the 1970 manifesto had also stated that ‘once a decision is 
taken ... the Prime Minister and his colleagues should have the courage to stick to 
it.’76 
 At the parliamentary level disappointment was palpable. Briefing the party 
Chairman in advance of a meeting of the 1922 Committee, Chris  Patten warned 
Peter Carrington to expect criticism of ‘the Government’s alleged “U” turns and its 
36.
74 Conservative Agentʼs Journal, Feb. 1973, Birmingham University Library, JN 1129.C6/C.
75 Green, Ideologies, p.234.
76 ʻA Better Tomorrowʼ, in Conservative Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, Ed. by I. Dale 
(2000).
publicity failures’.77  It was also a factor in the 1975 leadership contest. Richard 
Body, M.P for Holland with Boston, argued that Thatcher’s victory in the first round 
was ‘a measure of the frustrations within the party.’ He added, ‘There is no doubt in 
my mind that from now on a great deal of rethinking is going to be done on a wide 
range of important matters, especially those on which the Conservative 
Government turned turtle after 1970.’78  The recollections of senior Thatcherites 
confirm the importance of the u-turns. In an interview in 2006, Lord Parkinson 
argued that had the 1970 manifesto come out a few years later it would have been 
called Thatcherite, “The problem was, we abandoned it.”79
 At the lower levels Oswestry Association expressed their belief that the party 
should not have ‘turned about on ‘lame ducks’ and ‘prices and incomes policy’, and 
called for a ‘return to the views held in 1970.’80 At a heated Ludlow meeting the 
leadership was criticised for ‘leading from behind, indulging in instant tarmac 
government, having poor policies or no policies at all in view of the many shifts of 
direction.’81 A member at East Grinstead ‘called for a return to the policy on which 
we were elected in 1970.’82  At the party conference East Surrey urged the 
government to ‘carry out the Conservative policy set out in the 1970 election 
manifesto’, and Brent East expressed regret over the ‘continuance of policies 
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contrary to those expressed in the Party’s 1970 manifesto’.83  Later in 1977 
Canterbury Tories urged the party under Margaret Thatcher to ‘stick to our 
policies.’84
 The October 1974 manifesto, with its emphasis on ‘national unity’, received a 
lukewarm reception. One area committee argued that national unity ‘displayed 
weakness’ and a ‘lack of positive policies.’ They added, ‘Amongst some of our 
supporters  who wanted a Conservative government there was dismay at being 
asked to vote for a blank cheque.’85  Ashford Conservatives rejected a 
parliamentary candidate on the same grounds. The panel judged that ‘Roger was 
quite disappointing and did not impress them at all. He called for a national 
approach and seemed to favor a coalition government.’86 The Thatcherite hostility 
to consensus is clear. 
 The Heath government was viewed as the latest example of Conservative 
retreat, reinforced by the high expectations that surrounded the 1970 manifesto. 
This  gave rise to calls for a return to Conservative principles. Bill Deedes wrote in 
1973 that the ‘Tory rank and file find their government too radical by half and 
lacking determination to defend what they still believe to be Conservative 
principles.’ He added that ‘in so far as most of us at Westminster show a 
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disinclination to get excited about the issues which excite them, we seem 
inadequate custodians of Tory traditions.’87  The Conservative Agent’s Journal, 
usually light on policy, published a national newspaper article by the new member 
for Plymouth Sutton, Alan Clark. Entitled ‘Re-appraisal’, Clark states the need for 
the party to stand ‘firmly by its  essential principles.’ In the following issue of the 
journal a letter is published which reads: 
‘So much of what Alan Clark said in his article has been said by rank-and-file Conservatives for 
the past decade or more, and very largely these views have been ignored by the leaders of our 
party. What is more, as Mr Clark himself avows, where opinions have run contrary to official 
views the tendency has often been to condemn their propounders as ‘cranks’ or ‘troublemakers’ 
and the ‘we know best’ attitude has prevailed.’88 
One member at East Thanet questioned what the point was ‘of voting 
Conservative when so much of the present Government’s actions seem to have 
little, if anything, to do with true Conservative principles?’89
 It is  evident that by the mid-1970s a substantial portion of the grass-roots were 
alienated from the leadership. In 1973 Jasper Moore, the M.P for Ludlow, reported 
‘considerable outrage’ at the lack of communication between central office and his 
association.90  In 1974 Peter Morrison, the M.P for Chester, reported that he had 
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‘Once again’ received ‘complaints about the communications  hang-up between 
central office and constituency organisations.’91 A member at East Thanet resigned 
his membership claiming that the Heath government were ‘consistently ignoring 
the views of the members.’92 In 1975, The Times reported strong support in the 
West Midlands for a ‘totally new brand of leadership’. A parliamentary candidate 
complained that the party was being run from Westminster ‘without any real regard 
for the views of the people who do all the work out in the constituencies.’93 The 
Chairman of Crowbourgh Branch, called for ‘better communication’ within the party. 
The agent for Lewes suggested that the party improve its communications, 
applying ‘especially to communications upwards from the so-called grass-roots.’ 
Ashford C.P.C committee, having experienced a fall in turnout, speculated that 
‘after the example of the final two years of the Heath regime, members doubted 
whether anyone pays any attention to the reports submitted by the C.P.C 
committees?’ A member from Hartfield wondered if their political meeting was just 
a ‘cosmetic exercise’, ‘Will central office take any notice of our views?’ Heath, he 
said, was ‘arrogant, obstinate, pig-headed and dictatorial.’94 Oswestry were in no 
doubt that Heath had to go:
The meeting unanimously agreed that the really large problem of our role in opposition was the 
lack of leadership in the party. Even the likelihood of another election soon did not dissuade the 
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committee from believing a change of leader of the party essential and urgent. The names being 
mentioned included Sir Keith Joseph.95
 These extracts show an intensification of criticism. They are harsh considering 
Heath was either leader or still Prime Minister at the time. Disillusionment is 
reflected in levels of activism. Membership and donations are a recurring problem 
for Conservative associations across the country during the early-mid 1970s. In 
1974 the Treasurer of the Birmingham Conservative Political Group reported that 
funds raised for the general election appeal ‘had been very disappointing 
compared with the two previous elections’, and falling interest forced the group to 
take the bold step of removing ‘Conservative’ from its  title. At a meeting held in 
July, it was minuted: 
‘The Chairman of the club explained that the General  Committee had unanimously agreed to 
recommend to the members that the name of the club should be changed from The Birmingham 
Conservative Club Limited to the Birmingham Club Limited. He explained that, in the opinion of 
the General Committee, the political  name of the club dissuaded some people from becoming 
members and could, in the present political atmosphere, require some people to resign their 
membership.’96
This  is surely an indication that by the mid-1970s the Conservative party were 
alienating a considerable section of its base. 
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 Post Thatcher’s election as leader there is evidence that the grass-roots were 
happier. In 1976 the Chairman of Gillingham Conservatives welcomed ‘a 
willingness on the part of the parliamentary party to accept that some of our past 
policies pursued in the past have had effects  contrary to their intentions’, adding, 
‘In my view this  last year will eventually be seen to be one in which the 
Conservative party was reborn to its traditional ideology.’97  The Chairman of 
Folkestone and Hythe argued that ‘In Mrs Thatcher we have the makings of the 
Prime Minister of the century. Her eloquence and clear thinking have begun to 
express what most of us have for years been able only to feel and long for.’98 
Brighton and Hove wrote:
‘Twelve months ago the Conservative party was still  reeling from two General Election defeats in 
one year. Our supporters were bewildered over the way the voters had rejected policies and 
stands which had seemed obviously right. This mood is so different today! Throughout the party 
there is a firm confidence, first that voters are now coming to see the emptiness of t Labour’s 
promises and second that when in office we shall have learned from the past.’99
 Throughout the twentieth-century Conservatives were concerned about 
socialism and its  implications for society. It involved a degree of collectivism and 
redistribution which Conservatives  could only accommodate to a certain extent. 
The perception that Britain was moving inexorably left-ward gained influence 
during the post-war period. The middle-way was determined by points of reference 
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that were constantly being shifted to the left, and more vociferously right-wing 
policies were required to reverse the trend. It is perhaps unsurprising that the 
Conservative response revolved around individual freedom and related ideas such 
as property ownership, the free market, and choice. Broader socio-economic 
change underlay the process, as the Conservative party came to represent and 
share the frustrations of those ‘in the middle’. The sense of defeat shared by the 
whole party after the Heath u-turns resolved them not to turn back again.
43.

II.
THE OPPRESSED MIDDLE
If you were to speak to an ordinary Conservative in the mid-1970s he or she would 
have readily agreed that Labour were out to destroy the middle class; that under the 
post-war drive for equality the income differential between them and manual wage 
earners was being eroded. There were three specific concerns. First, inflation (which 
reached levels in the 1970s unseen since the first world war). Second, the level of tax 
required to fund public spending. And third, over-mighty trade unions and their ability 
to obtain above inflation wage settlements. Complaints  about these three issues 
were repeatedly relayed through the party’s lines of communication, and when the 
party leadership failed to respond favourably, Conservatives resorted to protest 
groups outside the party and withheld their support at by-elections.
 The problem was articulated as early as the 1950s. In The English Middle 
Classes, published in 1953, the right-wing Conservative M.P Angus Maude warned 
that through the pursuit of equality the social pyramid was being flattened.1 This fear 
was behind the ‘middle-class revolt’ later the same decade. The Middle Class 
Alliance, founded by the conservative M.P H.A Price, lobbied mostly on tax and 
inflation. The People’s  League for the Defence of Freedom, Chaired by Edward 
Martell, campaigned on the sole issue of trade union law reform. While they did not 
oppose the Conservative party directly, they were institutional manifestations of 
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disquiet. It was against this background of middle-class  agitation that Harold 
Macmillan sent his famous note to Michael Fraser asking what it was the middle 
classes wanted. Significantly, Fraser replied that they wanted a restoration of pre-war 
differentials between them and wage earners.2  Macmillan’s response is predictably 
dismissive. The middle class, he said, ‘resent the vastly improved condition of the 
working classes, and are envious of their apparent prosperity & the luxury of the 
rich.’3
 In by-elections the loss of Tunbridge Wells in 1956, Torquay, Edinburgh, 
Ipswich and Lewisham north in 1957, Torrington in 1958, and famously Orpington in 
1962, encouraged Macmillan to take the interests of the party’s core constituency 
more seriously. In 1957 he established the Policy Studies Group to look at options on 
inflation, public spending, and trade unions.4 In an attempt to rein in prices  he agreed 
to public spending cuts on the advice of his Chancellor Peter Thorneycroft, and in the 
1959 budget he cut Income and Purchase tax.
 The same fear for middle-class  differentials emerged again in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Middle Class Association, established by the Conservative M.P John 
Gorst in 1974, sought to defend the middle class against ‘spiteful’ tax increases at a 
time when they were ‘suffering disproportionately from inflation and massive erosions 
of savings and investment.’5   The more successful National Association for the 
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Defence of Freedom, campaigned mainly on trade union power. There were a 
plethora of other protest groups by in large occupied by the same issues. Once again 
this  agitation within the party’s ranks  coincided with a series of by-election defeats 
described by one commentator as a protest vote on a ‘massive scale’.6
Inflation 
Out of the three issues, perhaps the most important was inflation. Prices rose year-
on-year from 1966 to 1975 (except 1974), peaking at over 24%. By this point the 
Conservative leadership had prioritised the fight against inflation. Published in 1976, 
The Right Approach to the Economy states, ‘THE FIRST ESSENTIAL in economic 
management is  the conquest of inflation.’7  Many Conservatives  considered it the 
most urgent issue facing the country. Esmond Bulmer, the M.P for Kidderminster, told 
his constituents that ‘above all inflation must be reduced.’8 Approximately one-third of 
the motions submitted to conference on economic policy in 1975, referred to inflation. 
Swansea West called it ‘the greatest evil’ facing the country.9 
 According to Green the redistributive effect of inflation was seen as a ‘thinly 
disguised means of pursuing class war.’10  In 1975 Gosport called the party 
conference to ‘recognise that inflation is a socialist weapon.’11  More extreme still, 
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inflation was seen as a pre-condition for a Communist take-over. Jill Knight, the M.P 
for Edgbaston, highlighted inflation and warned that ‘Britain is farer down the road to 
a Communist take-over than most of us  dream.’12 It is also worth pointing out that 
there was concern for the impact of inflation on party associations being dependent 
on small donations from individual members. The Chairman of Gainsborough 
Division, for example, appealed to branches ‘to make a great effort this year towards 
our finances’ with ‘inflation making our task increasingly difficult.’13
 This  concern was anchored in the exposure of the Conservative party’s core 
constituency. In an interview soon after becoming leader Thatcher argued, ‘Not 
everyone’s had wage and salary increases to keep up with price increases, and 
those who have saved or have taken out insurance policies have suffered a lot, and 
it’s destroyed the faith of many people in some of our traditional ways of life, in being 
independent, in being thrifty and saving for a rainy day.’14 Jill Knight also spoke of the 
impact on the ‘many careful, thrifty people who have always paid their own bills, 
shouldered their own responsibilities, provided for their old age and stood on their 
own two feet.’15  After the party’s defeat in 1974, members  of the Birmingham 
Conservative Club, criticised the electorate for failing to support the Heath 
Government’s counter-inflation policy, and now anticipated policies which would do 
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‘untold harm to the nation, and which will severely penalise those who have worked 
hard to secure a decent standard for themselves and their families.’16
 A series of by-election defeats were widely considered a protest against the 
rising cost of living. Explaining the loss of support to the Liberals  at the Sutton on 
Cheam by-election, the agent at East Grinstead reported that those ‘in the middle’ 
were ‘worried by rising prices.’17 In 1973 both the Isle of Ely and Ripon were lost to 
the Liberals. The Times reported that ‘Tories  defected on a massive scale’, and some 
M.Ps felt that the anti-Tory vote was ‘a huge protest against the rising cost of living.’ 
Lord Carrington, the party Chairman, conceded that they were ‘bad mid-term results 
for the Government’ and ‘a protest vote against rising prices.’18  The trend was 
confirmed at Berwick-upon-Tweed. Later in 1974, the agent for Oswestry felt the 
need to appraise the midlands area agent of ‘the enormous amount of bitterness and 
ill-feeling which the present beef prices and milk prices have generated in our 
normally loyal supporters, many of who say they would abstain from voting at a 
General Election.’19 There was particular concern for pensioners with fixed incomes. 
The director of organisation, Sir Richard Webster, wrote to Jim Prior that Eastbourne 
‘is one of the oldest electorates in the country and, therefore, the main issues are 
bound to be prices and the cost of living, and thus the erosion of fixed pensions.’20 
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 The Heath government had entered office in 1970 pledging to cut inflation ‘at a 
stroke’, however Woodward argues that they had no intention of abandoning the 
post-war commitment to ‘full employment’ and the use of demand management to 
sustain conducive economic conditions.21 Indeed when unemployment touched one 
million in 1971 the Heath government applied the accelerator - the ‘Dash for Growth’. 
While this temporarily reduced unemployment it did little to prevent the subsequent 
inflationary surge. Robert Price argues that this was ‘the last and perhaps most 
dramatic of the attempts to use domestic demand to break through to the ‘virtuous 
cycle’ of demand-induced growth and investment. As History stands it failed.’22 
Inflation peaked in 1975, and unemployment climbed back to 1971 levels.
 As inflation rose the Heath government relied on micro-management of prices 
and incomes to hold down inflation. In his defence Heath argued that controls were 
the most ‘familiar’ counter-inflation policy available to government.23  Established 
opinion certainly viewed pay rises as  integral to the ‘New Inflation’. Sir John Hicks, 
Professor James Meade, Lord Kahn, and Aubrey Jones, were amongst a group of 
influential economists and commentators who supported pay controls. Despite their 
interventionist nature, there was also considerable Conservative support. When 
Heath indicated a return to statutory controls at a meeting of the 1922 committee, 
The Daily Telegraph reported that ‘Conservative back-benchers thumped their desks 
with approval.’24 In his  memoirs Heath claims that the 1972 party conference was 
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broadly supportive and Geoffrey Howe recalls that prices and incomes policy 
‘received almost universal welcome.’25 Motions to the party conference in 1972 and 
1973 appear to vindicate this  view. Stuart Ball argues that the bulk of the party 
accepted the need for statutory controls, and there was  even ‘some relief that 
government were asserting their authority.’26  
 In a sense it was convenient for Conservatives to make the link between 
militant trade unions and inflation. As Richard Vinen has pointed out, advocates of an 
incomes policy were not ‘soft’ on other issues, ‘On the contrary, their views were 
often tied to fierce anti-unionism.’27  This is  evident in conference motions and 
editorials that lay the blame for inflation firmly at the door of trade unionism, and is 
reflected in newspaper reports that signal some rank-and-file disquiet about dropping 
wage controls as late as  1978.28 In August 1974, the Chairman of the Conservative 
Agent’s Association argued that the country was faced with a serious crisis in part 
due to ‘wage inflation resulting from an abuse of industrial power.’29  In 1973 the 
Executive Council of Royal Tunbridge Wells  stated that ‘industrial unrest in Britain is 
rife and our whole economic future is  threatened by those who, refusing to accept the 
provisions of phase three, are prepared to bring the nation to its knees in order to 
achieve their own ends.’30 The parliamentary candidate for Small Heath, criticised the 
Labour party for failing to condemn ‘militants’ who were ‘furthering the disaster of 
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unqualified inflation.’31  Nonetheless,  Conservatives were ideologically opposed to 
state control of prices and incomes, and only supported them as far as they promised 
to reduce inflation. According to Ball, it was  more the ‘pressure of events’ which led to 
the acceptance of statutory controls rather than principle. As the party continued in 
the same direction the grass-roots ‘trooped dispiritingly behind it displaying various 
degrees of loyalty, anxiety and reluctance.’32 
 When incomes policy failed to control inflation, the inflationary consequences 
of demand management were reconsidered. In February 1974 the former Chancellor 
Anthony Barber conceded that ‘with the benefit of hindsight, it would appear that 
when we had decided to reflate with unemployment at one million, we had in fact 
done so too quickly.’33 This criticism was being voiced further down the party.  In April 
a member at East Grinstead argued that the Heath government ‘went for growth - 
failed, and by increasing the money supply produced roaring inflation.’34  Another 
official insisted that ‘control of the money supply must be maintained’. If an increase 
in demand was necessary then ‘a figure for planned increase in money supply should 
be agreed and adhered to.’35 The appearance of terms such as the ‘money supply’ 
was influenced by a renaissance in monetary economics. ‘Monetarists’ argued that 
inflation was always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon and therefore a 
consequence of monetary policy rather than wage inflation. 
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 In a damning indictment of the Heath government, Keith Joseph argued that 
‘We were dominated by the fear of unemployment’. ‘It was this’, he argued, ‘which 
made us turn back on our better judgement and try to spend our way out of 
unemployment.’36  It was a view already being expressed by party activists. Four 
months earlier the Chairman of Buxted Branch, East Grinstead, had argued that the 
Heath government ‘panicked’ in the face of unemployment, and by producing inflation 
their ‘economic policy failed’.37 
 Pay controls  were increasingly unpopular with the grass  roots who demanded 
a return to the party’s  1970 position. Oswestry expressed their belief that the party 
lost the 1974 election on its  economic record and should not have ‘turned about’ on 
prices and incomes policy.38  Similarly a committee member from East Grinstead 
criticised the Heath government for retreating from its under-taking to reject statutory 
wage controls, ‘From then on we lost the trust of many supporters.’39 
 Consequently the full employment objective was finally abandoned. Although 
no figure was estimated, unemployment was accepted as an inevitable consequence 
of counter-inflation policy. In May of 1974 Keith Joseph acknowledged that 
‘unemployment will be unavoidable if inflation is to be mastered.’40 In 1978, Adam 
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Ridley of the Conservative Research Department warned of ‘a prolonged period of 
high unemployment’ and suggested a ‘redefinition’ of the highest sustainable level.41 
The party itself was understandably anxious about unemployment. However, there 
were calls  for monetary discipline at the expense of growth. The constituency council 
of East Grinstead questioned whether the country could ‘continue to afford a high 
rate of growth?’, and called for ‘stricter control of the money supply’.42 
 Margaret Thatcher’s  election as party leader strengthened the case. At the 
1975 conference few motions called for pay controls and most called for control of 
the money supply. The usual suspects such as Brent East (Rhodes Boyson’s 
constituency) were calling for ‘a policy of monetary restraint’. However even the 
mining valley of Rhondda, which had previously expressed support for pay controls, 
now also called for ‘an immediate reduction in government spending and borrowing’ 
to combat inflation.43
Public Spending and Taxation
The focus here on reducing government spending to influence the supply of money is 
instructive. It was a tactic that met criticism from the celebrated Monetarist Milton 
Friedman, who advocated a move to Monetary Base Control.44  This required the 
government to regulate private lending and lending between banks  as well as 
54.
41 Ibid. p.66
42 East Grinstead minutes, 30 April 1974.
43 92nd Conservative Conference 1975, pp.94-96.
44 D. Pierce, P. Tynsome, Monetary Economics: Theories, Evidence and Policy (1985 edn.) p.281.
government spending, an option rejected by the Thatcherites. The papers of the 
Shadow Cabinet’s  Economic Reconstruction Group, reveal the emerging focus on 
reducing government expenditure and the public sector borrowing requirement. 
Geoffrey Howe argued for ‘proper management of the money supply’ through ‘greater 
restraint and economy in public spending.’45 Keith Joseph suggested that the party 
should ‘Aim to cut the government share of G.N.P from 63% to 40% in two 
Parliaments - so as to slash inflation.’46 
 Pure Monetarism or not, it tapped into a second and longstanding grievance of 
Conservative voters, namely public spending and taxation. Keith Joseph’s aim to 
drastically cut the government’s share of G.N.P, is  reflected lower down the party. In 
1975 Royal Tunbridge Wells complained that spending had ‘soared to a level at 
which it disposed of 60% of the Gross National Product, and despite increased 
taxation the Government was forced to treble its borrowing.’47  There was a sense 
that the rising share of national output consumed by the State was being wasted on 
grandiose socialists schemes. Keith Speed, the M.P for Ashford, raised this particular 
concern:
‘...the Labour government had allocated in its programme huge sums of money to be spent on 
doctrinaire socialist schemes, a total of £3,000 million in all, including £40 million on the withdrawal 
of pay beds, £25 million on Comprehensive Schools, £30 million on the Dock Labour Scheme, 
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£400 million on the community land bill, £550 million on the Nationalisation of the Aircraft Industry 
and £900 million on North Sea Oil.’48
In 1972 a member at Birmingham lamented that taxation was ‘being used as a 
political weapon to hinder the entrepreneur, and by the total receipts amounting to 
near 50% of the Gross National Product, to foster socialism.’49 
Fiscal discipline became the method, not only for controlling inflation, but for reducing 
the burden of tax. In 1953 Angus Maude had argued that ‘Taxation today is 
substantially heavier than before the war’, and like inflation, was turning the screw on 
the middle classes.50  It was  a principal issue behind the middle class revolt later in 
the decade, and Macmillan responded by introducing the largest ever single cut in 
income tax in 1959. By the 1970s similar complaints  surfaced. Philip Vander Elst, the 
Editorial Director of the Conservative Selsdon Group observed,
‘The old pyramid-shaped income structure with a few rich people at the top and the mass at the 
bottom of the pyramid, has been replaced by a diamond-shaped pattern in which the great majority 
are affluent earners in the middle of the diamond, paying their full  share of taxes. This means that 
the Socialist prejudice in favour of high public expenditure and high taxes conflicts with the 
economic interests of a growing “middle class”.’51
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Again, concern for the people ‘in the middle’ is evident lower down the Conservative 
party. In 1976 a member at West Gloucestershire sent a plea to Thatcher for ‘the 
middle section of the community which at the moment is being over-taxed and 
victimised to a point far in excess of the other two sections of the populous.’52 
On tax reform there were mounting calls  for a new approach. Thanet East CPC note 
that the items which raised most interest were, along with educational standards, 
‘controlling public expenditure’ and ‘the Conservative approach to taxation.’53 There 
was a particular concern about the effect of inflation on non-indexed taxation, such 
as income tax. The Right Approach the Economy noted, ‘the periodic adjustment of 
the income tax threshold has failed to keep pace with the increase in average 
earnings.’54  Consequently there were calls for a tax switch from direct to indirect 
taxation. In the late 1960s Ian Macleod argued for a reduction in ‘the burden of direct 
taxation as soon as possible.’55  In a policy statement entitled Make Life Better, 
Edward Heath pledged to reduce rates of direct tax ‘to give incentive and reward 
enterprise.’56 The 1970 Manifesto followed through with a pledge to reduce income 
tax. The grass roots were largely supportive and continued to press  for income tax 
relief. In 1972 a Birmingham member lamented that Britain had ‘struggled for thirty 
years under the highest rate of direct taxation in the world.’57 
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The Trade Unions
 As early as 1957 Central Office had identified a hardening of attitudes to the 
trade unions. Reginald Maudling ‘reported strong feeling in the party against trade 
unions’, and James Douglas of the CRD observed ‘a slight move to the right on trade 
union issues.’58  By the 1970s attitudes had hardened still further. In a burst of 
frustration reported to Central Office at the beginning of 1973, Ludlow members 
complained about ‘softness on many problems like prisoners, the influx of asians and 
strike pickets.’59 At an Oswestry C.P.C meeting it was concluded that ‘In the field of 
Industrial Relations... our party’s attempt to defeat those wishing to bring the country 
to chaos was right but... we should have been firm over the previous miners strike 
and other industrial problems.’60 
This, as with inflation and tax, was anchored in the exposure of middle-income 
differentials, where there was resentment towards trade unions who were able to 
secure above inflation wage settlements for their members. David Watt, the Political 
Editor of the Financial Times, observed that the Conservative party in the country 
were ‘quite obviously far more trenchant on the subject of the unions than its 
representatives in parliament.’ He added, ‘The middle class, in revolt against inflation 
and the loss of differential status resulting from the activities of powerful trade unions, 
gave ministers to understand that if they were seen to authorise another ‘sell out’ on 
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the lines of the Wilberforce Settlement two years earlier, there would be virtually no 
Conservative party left.’61 
 Reflecting this resentment Jill Knight observed, ‘In Britain today, many careful, 
thrifty people who have always paid their own bills, shouldered their own 
responsibilities, provided for their old age and stood on their own two feet, look about 
them in anger and amazement at the hordes of people who have never done any of 
these things - and yet somehow have ended up with the colour TV sets and the 
holidays abroad which they simply cannot afford.’62 The ‘hordes’ expresses perfectly 
the resentment towards the unionised working class. The East Grinstead C.P.C 
officer argued that those ‘in the middle’ - ‘small business men, junior executives, 
shopkeepers, farmers’ - ‘found themselves over-taken in the wages stakes’ and 
‘found it difficult to keep up standards.’ The same people had ‘from frustration 
deserted the Conservative party.’63
 Pay controls, which had been used to contain wage inflation from the mid 
1960s, added insult to injury. They disenfranchised the skilled and professional 
classes who had traditionally been able to use their skills  or qualifications to demand 
a premium. One official argued that ‘man must get true deserves for effort and wages 
policy will not give him this.’64 Instead they enfranchised the large trade unions, such 
as the National Union of Miners, who had the organisation to demand exemptions. 
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The agent for East Grinstead warned that the people ‘in the middle’ were ‘worried by 
rising prices, rates, season tickets’ and ‘show resentment at the success achieved by 
militant industrial trade unions and feel let down because the government appeared 
to give way before industrial action and then naively spent so long trying to achieve 
agreement before being forced to freeze.’65  On the specific plight of the skilled 
working class, a regional profile by the West Midlands Area, identified ‘a shortage of 
skilled labour ... the result of successive rounds of rigid pay policy which has left 
skilled men earning comparatively little more than their unskilled colleagues.’66
 Here in-lies the motivation behind calls  for a return to ‘free collective 
bargaining.’ Grass-root’s support for pay controls was often conditional on them 
being a temporary arrangement. In 1973 South Battersea called for the party 
conference to reaffirm its belief in free collective bargaining and to consider that ‘any 
permanent state control of prices and incomes is  incompatible with a free society.’67 
Hackney urged the government to ‘announce whether it rejects  the function of the 
price mechanism permanently or just temporarily?’68  At the beginning of the 
government’s phase three the PPC for Reading North congratulated the government 
on phase two of the prices and incomes policy, but urged that phase three should 
begin ‘a gradual return to a freer economy.’69
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 There were other concerns regarding the trade unions, but this resentment 
was the motive force behind a great deal of anti-union feeling. Thatcher and her 
supporters  clearly reflected these concerns. There was the same resentment of the 
‘hordes’ of people, or ‘those with the big battalions able to hold the country to 
ransom’, while the unorganised were ‘worried stiff.’ 70   Again in 1975 Thatcher asked, 
‘Who profits  now? Not the people who have always tried to pull their weight. But 
those who use their weight to push others around.’71
 The 1970s saw the emergence of a phalanx of protests groups, primarily 
exercised by trade unions and overwhelmingly drawn from Conservative voters. The 
Current Affairs Press was set-up by Ross McWhirter in 1974 with the ‘express 
purpose of standing up to the unions.’72 A flyer by McWhirter entitled ‘Standing up to 
the Unions’, found its way into Conservative Central Office. Presumably it was 
considered of interest. It reveals working capital of £100,000 and their ability to print 
three million newspapers a day in the event of a national printers strike. It also 
describes operation ‘Road-lift’, designed to take effect in the event of a national rail 
strike. In an experiment in Brighton, two hundred car owners offered 700 seats for 
more than one thousand commuters who applied for transport facilities.73  The 
Current Affairs Press, though officially non-partisan, pledged its support to the new 
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leader of the Opposition: ‘Mrs Margaret Thatcher deserves, and must be given full 
support not only of the Conservative party but of anti-socialists everywhere.’74
 
 The National Association for Freedom (NAFF) was perhaps the most 
successful anti-trade union campaign group, attracting some 20,000 members within 
a year. Its activities  verged on the paramilitary, most famously during the Grunwick 
dispute in 1976. Grunwick was a mail-order film processing lab in North London. 
When its workers went on strike in 1976 its  owner, George Ward, fired them. This 
provoked an angry reaction from the Trade Union movement. When Royal Mail 
workers refused to handle packages from Grunwick, NAFF launched operation ‘Pony 
Express’. Its activists  delivered Grunwick’s  processed films overnight dispatching 
their consignments in post boxes across the country.  In this pivotal event the trade 
union blockade was subverted. Although NAFF was  officially non-partisan, it had 
strong links with the Conservative party. Speaking in 1978 the founder of NAFF, 
Major John Gouriet, told an audience, ‘We have got to see that the Conservative 
Party, which we hope will be elected, does stand up for Conservative principles.’ 
Thatcher herself spoke at NAFF’s inaugural subscription dinner in January 1977, with 
the 500 supporters  who attended giving her a standing ovation. Jill Knight was 
amongst a number of Tory M.Ps who sat on NAFF’s Council. Others  included Rhodes 
Boyson, Nicholas Ridley, Winston Churchill, Stephen Hastings, and Sir Fredrick 
Bennett. In the late 70s Neill Nugent observed that these links were mirrored locally 
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‘where many NAFF supporters are actively involved in Conservative politics, as 
councillors, officials or active members.’75 
 However, there was an important twist to the story which had implications  for 
the Thatcher opposition’s approach to the trade union question. As income 
differentials were squeezed by inflation and trade union bargaining power, and with 
no prospect of an end to pay controls, the same socio-economic group that Thatcher 
was trying to represent started to imitate the techniques of organised labour. There 
was an expansion in ‘non-manual’ or ‘white-collar’ trade unionism from the mid-1960s 
onwards. The overall non-manual trade union density increased from approximately 
thirty to forty per cent from 1964 to 1974. A plethora of ‘white-collar’ unions emerged, 
too many to mention here. A typical example is  The Association of Scientific, 
Technical and Managerial Staffs, which increased membership by 700 per cent 
between 1964 and 1977.76  By the mid-1970s white-collar unionism accounted for 
almost a third of the Trade Union Congress77, and Labour party affiliation declined 
from 70 per cent in 1956 to 52.5 per cent in 1976.78 
 This  development in trade unionism was recognised by the Conservative party. 
In 1976 Thatcher assured the Conservative Trade Unionists  Conference, ‘The 
Conservative Party is  not hostile to Trade Unions, but believes in a strong and 
responsible Trades Union movement. Strong to protect and represent the interests  of 
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people at work.’ Thatcher was candid about her motives. ‘There is another very good 
reason why the Conservative Party would not want to work against the unions. Our 
next Conservative Government will have been elected with the help of millions of 
votes from individual members of trade unions. About a third of all trade unionists 
regularly vote for us.’79  Lower down the party there was concern that trade union 
support had been lost by Heath’s Industrial Relations Act. At a Cheshire political 
meeting, the North/West agent noted some concern that ‘opinion had been alienated 
as so many Conservative spokesmen categorised all Trade Unionists as  militants 
rather than referring to the left-wing minority’.80 In 1974 a member at East Grinstead 
suggested that ‘Many moderate trade unionists felt unfairly blamed for inflation’.81 
 However, Thatcherite sympathy with unionists was largely reserved for skilled 
and professional employees, or those ‘in the middle’. Although Thatcher stressed that 
the Conservatives did not want a fight with the unions, she added that she would not 
be prepared to accept ‘a T.U.C diktat’ ‘in exchange for rigid pay controls which 
frustrate the energies and aspirations of skilled craftsmen and managers alike.’ There 
were echoes of this lower down the party. When skilled trade unions resisted pay 
policy in the late 1970s, Maidstone Association noted the ‘increasing determination of 
the Trade Unions to resist a continuation of the present level of income restraint, and 
at British Leyland we witnessed an expression of the demand for the return of 
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differentials for the skilled worker.’82  This extract is highly significant. Whereas in 
1973, Royal Tunbridge Wells had criticised trade unions for bringing the nation to its 
knees by not accepting the provisions  of Phase Three, by 1976 Maidstone’s 
sympathies clearly lie with the Unions. 
 Consequently, Conservatives were cautious about their tone towards trade 
unionists. Though sympathetic to NAFF, the party rejected their hostile stance, 
remained officially neutral during the Grunwick dispute, and never attempted a wide-
ranging Industrial Relations Act like the Heath Government had tried and failed to do. 
This  was determined by a certain level of sympathy with trade unions, especially 
where they represented those ‘in the middle’ who had resorted to unionism due to 
inflation and pay controls. Green argues that the leadership adopted this cautious 
strategy ‘in spite of deep-seated resentment of trade unions in the party’s grass 
roots.’83 However, it is important to add that there was some sympathy. 
 The economic status of the middle class is  central to understanding 
Thatcherism. Although a large and fragmented group, those ‘in the middle’ were all 
affected by one of the three issues explored above. Accordingly the Conservative 
party made inflation, tax and trade unionism top priorities. Considered from the point 
of view of consequences, the significance of middle class income differentials is 
clear. According to Avner Offer there is no doubt about the distributional effect of the 
Thatcher years. There was a large shift in wealth away from the unskilled to the 
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managerial and professional middle class. On incomes the Thatcher government 
‘preferred ‘stimulating’ inequality to a regimented drive for equality.’84
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III.
THE INDIVIDUAL IS SOVEREIGN 
Whereas the previous chapter was concerned with the grievances of the 
Conservatives’ core constituency, this chapter looks at the development  of 
individualism. The Thatcher programme was ‘atomistic’, designed to stimulate 
economic differentials. Keywords were ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, ‘rights’, ‘responsibilities’ 
and related concepts  such as ‘the free market’, ‘private property’ and ‘choice’. The 
main part of this chapter will look at the emergence of individualism in the context of 
the 1970s with a particular focus on the free economy, property ownership and 
choice.  This was the narrative of Thatcherism.
 In March 1959, Ian Macleod observed the expanding middle class and 
recognised  the electoral opportunity for the Conservative party: 
‘Perhaps they own a house, or, more probably they are buying one through a Building Society. 
They have a car and a television set - perhaps a refrigerator and a washing machine ... At this time 
of year you will find them looking at gaily-coloured travel brochures and planning their holidays ... 
They are for the most part employees drawing high wages in a prosperous and expanding 
economy ... We [The Tory party] can give them the opportunity they long for instead of the equality 
they despise.’1
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 Consequently the Conservative appeal at the 1959 election was constructed 
around the oppressed middle class. In the campaign the party made a concerted and 
expensive effort to rid itself of its upper class, patrician image, identifying members of 
the new middle class  with Conservatism: ‘Pictures of housewives, children, manual 
workers and white-coated technicians all appeared on bill-boards with the caption, 
‘You’re looking at a Conservative’.2 As  outlined in Chapter One there was a focus on 
individual freedom, on a strong pound, free enterprise and property ownership. In the 
aftermath of the 1959 general election, the Labour M.P Patrick Gordon Walker 
observed that ‘the Tories identified themselves with the new working class rather 
better than we did.’3 
 To some extent this foreshadowed strategy in the 1970s. In an article entitled 
‘Conservatism and the Changing Order’, the Conservative M.P Eldon Griffiths 
essentially makes the same observation as Macleod in the 50s. He wrote that 
‘Competitive man is swinging hard against Labour.’ ‘There is, for one thing, the 
Labour dogma of egalitarianism’, which was ‘hostile to the ambitions of competitive 
man.’ Bulmer testifies that the party was still trying to shed its  upper class image. He 
argues that ‘competitive man’ were ‘convinced ... that the Tory party would be 
reluctant to open wide the gates.’ He added that ‘Conservatives must and can dispel 
this  erroneous impression. It ought not to be difficult for Mr. Heath - himself a 
competitor, par excellence.’4 Heath was indeed able to appeal to this group of people 
in 1970,  though he subsequently lost their support. 
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 Part of the reason for this was the Heath government’s return to corporatism, 
in particular their negotiations with the ‘peak powers’ of industry, the CBI and the 
TUC, over economic policy. This  produced a crowding-out effect with the dominant 
interest groups exercising enormous influence over the economic terms of play. In an 
article entitled ‘The Plight of the Small Man’, the Conservative M.P for Kidderminster 
argued that ‘The great offence is to be independent, to stand outside the Trades 
Union movement or not fit in a tidy way with the great dream world of some powerful 
civil servant.’5  There were echoes of this  in the activist base. North West C.P.C 
suggested the electoral advantage of opposing the ‘socialist’s impersonal society’.6 In 
an article titled ‘Are you important?’, the leader of Birmingham Conservatives warned 
that ‘If we are not important we are as expendable as  a soldier ... or as a union man 
when he refuses to toe the line.’7 At the party conference, The Wrekin called for the 
Conservative party to be seen as ‘the champion of those people whose interests are 
not represented by the obvious pressure groups, e.g. trades  unions, employers’ 
organisations.’ ‘...it is  not sufficient to have a traditional commitment - it must be the 
constant and declared purpose of the party to be the “protectors  of the great 
unrepresented”.’8   Consequently, whereas Heath had tried to reach a corporatist 
settlement, Thatcher was highly resistant. As Green argues, confrontation with 
industry was easier than a constructive relationship ‘in terms of holding her party and 
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its constituency together.’9  The outcome was a free market economic model. As 
Bredon Evans argues, Thatcher ‘invited voters to conceive of themselves outside 
groups and the become isolated actors in the flourishing market relations  of affluent 
capitalism.’10
 There was a particular focus on financial reward. Elden Griffiths argued that 
Competitive Man ‘expect to reap a full, not a partial reward for effort.’ He added that 
‘Far from idealising the onward march of organised labour, they see it far too often as 
the champion of something for nothing, forever pressing inflationary wage 
demands.’11  One officer at East Grinstead argued that ‘the party must return to 
espousing great issues which divide Conservatives from Labour - individual 
incentive, proper reward for effort’, ‘Man must get true deserves for effort he puts into 
his work’.12  At the 1975 party conference, the motion for the debate on economic 
policy, prices, taxation and savings, called for ‘the creation of a new social climate 
which rewards hard work and enterprise.’13 Sevenoaks expressed concern over ‘the 
growing erosion of the status and income of the professional and middle classes’, 
urging the party to effect policies ‘to ensure a proper reward for the contribution that 
these groups make.’14
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 This  was reflected at the top of the party. In her first conference speech as 
leader Thatcher set out her ‘vision’ of ‘A man's right to work as he will, to spend what 
he earns, to own property, to have the State as servant and not as master.’ ‘These’, 
she argued were ‘the British inheritance.’ ‘They are the essence of a free economy. 
And on that freedom all our other freedoms depend.’15 This  went down well with party 
activists. Worthing association described it as ‘one of the finest speeches ever 
heard ... and the spontaneous reception accorded her was no more than deserved.’16 
Hove Conservatives spoke favorably of the new leader’s conference debut. ‘She has 
repeatedly shown how we can achieve a freer society’. ‘Her vision of a man’s  right to 
work as he will, to spend what he earns, to own property, to have the State as 
servant and not as master has  enabled us to make contact with the many voters 
whom we had lost.’17 The ‘many voters’ is presumably a reference to the party’s loss 
of support to the Liberals between 1972 and 1974. 
 This  and a series of word-punching speeches by the party leader rallied 
Conservatives to the defence of ‘freedom’. Jill Knight warned that Labour’s  re-
election would see ‘the end of all freedom in Britain.’18  Tim Sainsbury, the M.P for 
Hove, stressed the threat to ‘individual freedom’ and called for ‘desperate efforts’ to 
preserve ‘freedom of choice.’19 In 1977 Eastborne Conservatives warned that ‘If the 
socialists  win, we shall see the end of freedom ... freedom is what we must fight for ... 
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All of you vote Tory!’20 The C.P.C officer at Ashford called on Conservatives to ‘fight 
for personal freedom.’21 
The Free Economy
One of the key aims of the Thatcher government was to ‘roll back the frontiers of the 
State’, to be achieved by replacing the mixed economy with a largely private one.22 
Criticising the mixed economy in 1974, Joseph argued that ‘Judging from the past 30 
years and paraphrasing Lincoln, we have to ask ‘can a country prosper, half 
collectivist, half free?’  The ‘free’ economy was being frustrated and undermined by 
socialism, by excessive taxation, trade unionism, inflation and even ‘well-intentioned 
social workers and misguided left-wing teachers’, all sapping the will to work. He 
called it ‘the socialist vendetta’. Socialists had been ‘downright antagonistic towards 
our wealth producers’, and had ‘condemned the profit motive’ and ‘attacked profits 
indiscriminately.’ The private sector, Joseph argued, was trying to survive with one 
hand tied behind its back.23
 As far as Jill Knight was concerned, the private economy was being 
deliberately sabotaged. In 1975 she reported an ‘unprecedented number of letters 
from Birmingham firms, and they all say the same thing ... ‘please explain to mr 
Benn/Shore/Foot that what they are doing to industry is  going to mean the end of my 
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firm’. I write back, explaining that Messrs Benn, Shore and Foot know exactly what 
they are doing.’ She warned that the sabotage of private enterprise was another pre-
condition for a communist take-over.24 Esmond Bulmer argued that ‘to aspire to be a 
Capitalist is the greatest crime of all ... a vendetta is  being pursued.’25 Constituency 
officers complained about ‘the current fashion to denigrate the profit motive and 
capitalism generally.’ Another added that the ‘denigration of profit motive must cease’, 
the ‘survival of capitalism depends upon the profit motive.’26 West Gloucestershire 
political discussion group declared that ‘Capitalism in private hands is the only way to 
solve the country’s economic problems.’27 A plethora of conference motions in 1975 
called for a reassertion of private enterprise. 
 The particular concern for the profit motive was related with the concern for 
income differentials. It was felt that the rewards for business men were being eroded. 
‘Never in history’, Thatcher argued, ‘have so many different forces joined together to 
squeeze industries rate of profitability.’ Again, Inflation, tax and pay controls are listed 
by Thatcher as the principal forces. Consequently ‘the rate of profit earned by 
companies has been halved since the early sixties.’28 There is some evidence that 
key managing directors, a small but powerful Conservative constituency, were 
frustrated with the party’s economic record. The Chairman of Warwick and 
Leamington Division canvased executive opinion at a Bank of England lunch. It was 
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reported to Sir Richard Webster that ‘the whole conversation over lunch was directed 
to the record of the Government ... and six of them were sweeping and wholesale in 
their condemnation of the Government, particularly of its  economic policy.’ The 
directors in attendance were ‘reaching the end of their patience with the Conservative 
party.’29 Aside from senior directors, the specific concern for small businesses was 
anchored in the socio-economic base of the Conservative party, the same people ‘in 
the middle’ whose differentials were most exposed.
 If the lasting image of Thatcherism are the multi-nationals of Canary Wharf, it 
had more humble origins. At a speech to the Institute of Directors, Thatcher saw the 
encouragement of small businesses and the self-employed as an important step in 
restoring a prosperous private sector.30  It was the ‘small businessmen’, the ‘self-
employed’, and ‘shopkeepers’, that the grass-roots empathised with the most. 
Esmond Bulmer called it ‘the plight of the small man’. ‘Small businesses’, he 
stressed, ‘were being progressively destroyed by inflation, taxation and 
discrimination.’31 The Social Security Act of 1975 caused particular concern for the 
self-employed. One deputy-agent appraised central office of ‘groups ... being formed 
to fight the Government proposals imposing substantial increases in National 
Insurance Contributions for the self-employed, and they should be a natural source of 
support for the party.’ It also warned of some discontent with the Heath government’s 
introduction of earnings-related contributions in the 1973 Social Security Act. The 
agent noted that this new system hit a ‘natural source of support for the party’, and 
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the ‘damaging impression’ that the party was  dismissive of the self-employed needed 
to be killed.32
 The plight of small business was recognised by the Small Business Bureau 
(1976), founded within Conservative Central Office and chaired by Conservative M.P 
David Mitchell. Mitchell also chaired the Conservative Parliamentary Smaller 
Businesses Committee. He addressed the first meeting of the SBB in 1976, telling an 
audience of 250, ‘I hope this shows the Conservative party cares about small 
businesses and the self employed. and appreciate how they have suffered through 
excessive socialist legislation.’33 Group membership of the SBB included the National 
Federation of the Self-employed, the Union of Independent Companies, the 
Association of Independent Businesses, and the Association of Self-employed 
People. The Federation of Small Businesses (1974), the Forum for Private Business 
(1977), and the National Association of the Self-employed (1981), were other 
independent protest groups. Like the middle-class protest groups, these show a 
willingness on the part of the Conservative core constituency to organise. 
 Opposition to nationalisation was an adjunct to the emerging market 
philosophy. From his collation of conference motions Mike Wilson observes that 
denunciations were ‘ritualistic’ though numerically smaller than on other issues.34 
Whereas small business were seen as a repository of Conservative values, the 
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nationalised industries represented everything that was wrong with the country. They 
were perceived as  overmanned, unproductive, highly unionised and a drain on the 
productive economy. Recommendations often stopped short of outright 
denationalisation, but often included a stop to further nationalisation and steps to 
improve efficiency. In 1967 Thatcher argued that ‘Although many of us have deep 
philosophical reasons for being against nationalisation and for private enterprise ... 
we must accept that many people judge these things purely upon the practical 
results. So let us start by adopting this  approach.’35 By in large this was the approach 
of the grass-roots. For instance a branch officer at East Grinstead argued that the 
Heath government’s ‘lame duck policy was  right’, adding that existing nationalised 
industries ‘should be forced to shake out excess labour when employment rises to 
stop bidding up labour costs and increase the industry’s own productivity.’36 
Property Ownership
Property ownership was well established in Conservative thought. William Mallock 
viewed it as a form of incentive. Lord Hailsham saw it as an essential pre-condition of 
liberty. ‘No man’, Hailsham argued, ‘is  fully free unless possessing some rights of 
property, since property is the means  whereby he develops his personality by 
impressing it upon his external surroundings without dependence on the will of 
others.’37 The Scottish Unionist Noel Skelton, argued for the dispersal of economic 
power in a series  of articles  for The Spectator in 1923 titled ‘Constructive 
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Conservatism’. ‘Property Owning Democracy’ appears here for the first time. His 
ideas influenced Anthony Eden who advocated a ‘Property Owning Democracy’ at 
the 1946 party conference. 
 The extension of property ownership was central to Thatcherism. Its emerging 
importance is clear in policy discussions. A Steering Group report circulated in 1978 
called for a ‘Capital owning democracy’. ‘The aim here’, the report outlined, ‘would be 
a wide-ranging and coherent programme to introduce grass-roots private capitalism.’ 
It would ‘collide head-on with the most fashionable opinion in politics, trade union and 
academic circles, because they try to restore private capitalism ... in place of state 
paternalism and the doctrine of comparability regardless of achievement.’38   The 
Steering Committee were also keen to move away from economic issues to non-
economic ones. ‘Among our positive themes’, the committee concluded, ‘the most 
important were the ‘ownership theme’ (whether of homes, pensions or shares), and 
the value of “dispersed ownership.”39  In the mid-1980s this theme emerged as 
‘Popular Capitalism’. It was, in Thatcher’s words, ‘A crusade to enfranchise the many 
in the economic life of the nation’.40
 Lower down the party, there was wide support for property owning democracy. 
Alan Clark, the newly elected M.P for Plymouth and Sutton, listed ‘the creation of a 
property owning democracy in the widest sense’ as an essential principle. Within the 
grass-roots, an editorial called for called for the ‘wider spread of responsibility 
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through a property owning democracy.’41  At the 1975 party conference Meridan 
reaffirmed its  belief in the property owning democracy. Ilford South called for 
everyone to be ‘actively encouraged to participate in a property owning democracy.’42
 Home ownership was perhaps the most important aspect of the property 
owning crusade.  A report on ‘The Sale of Council Houses’ by Michael Heseltine, 
stated that the ‘expansion of home ownership is  one of the most important things we 
can do to spread wealth and ownership, and therefore independence from the State, 
among our citizens.’43 In 1974 East Grinstead Conservatives highlighted the ‘need to 
modernise Building Societies’ and the Chairman of Crowborough West branch also 
suggested that there was ‘room for modernisation in the Building Societies.’44 This 
foreshadows the Thatcher government’s de-regulation of Building Societies, allowing 
them to leverage their loans thereby increasing the supply of credit and crucially, 
mortgages. One of the party’s  concerns  with inflation was the resultant high interest 
on mortgages. One member remarked that the effect of inflation was not just to 
devalue savings but to push mortgages ‘out of reach’ from the ordinary man.45 
 One of the Thatcher government’s flag-ship policies  was ‘The Right to Buy’, 
which allowed council house tenants the right to buy their homes at a discounted 
rate, variable depending on the length of tenure. Some policy-makers considered 
simply giving council houses to their tenants for free, but it was thought this would 
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outrage mortgage holders.46  As Gilmour points out, this had antecedents  in 
Conservative policy. IN 1957 Macmillan gave the power to local authorities  to sell 
council houses. It was voluntary rather than compulsory, and many Conservative 
councils allowed tenants to buy their homes in the 1960s. The Heath government 
continued, allowing councils to discount the properties  by up to 20 per cent. The 
Thatcher government pushed the policy further, selling almost 1.5 million properties 
from 1979 to 1990. 
 Nevertheless, the Right to Buy was a political masterstroke and 
enthusiastically supported by Conservatives, especially in the localities where the 
sale of council houses  was a divisive issue. Soon after becoming leader Thatcher 
told the Conservative Central Council:
‘Look at some of the municipal barons who treat the massive council  estates they have built as 
their private political fiefs. It is no wonder they resist to the last ditch the sale of council houses. 
Home-ownership scares them. It threatens their power.’47
In Birmingham, the leader of the Conservative group Alderman Griffin, warned that 
‘For years now the Socialists in Birmingham have been acquiring large tracts of land 
and a great deal of property by way of back-door municipalisation’, ‘1,250,000 more 
municipal housing, heavily subsidised, and millions of millions of bricks  unwanted by 
private builders because the government won’t allow homes for sale.’48 In 1968, Jill 
Knight complained about ‘savage clamp-down on council house sales’ as ‘one more 
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manifestation of the dictatorship inherent in our present administration.’49 In Hove 
members rejected ‘the philosophy that the way to solve the county’s housing crisis is 
by building large municipal housing estates’, instead calling for ‘Housing associations 
and the private sector be encouraged to offer a wider selection of accommodation.’50
 Similar to Noel Skelton’s ‘constructive conservatism’, home ownership was 
only part of the property owning democracy. Another was share holding, advanced by 
the Thatcher government by the sale of stakes  in the privatised utilities, or ‘selling the 
family silver back to the family.’51 It was the aspect of privatisation that Thatcher was 
most enthusiastic about, and was reflected within the party grass-roots by the Wider 
Share Ownership Campaign. A Birmingham grass-roots magazine reports  that twenty 
to thirty young Conservatives  had formed The Forward Investment Club, which 
‘highlights one of the objectives of the Wider Share Ownership Council.’52
Choice
 Strongly related to individualism was the emergence of ‘choice’, which remains 
central to policy debate today. Choice was often attached to any mention of individual 
freedom. For example, Tim Sainsbury, the M.P for Brighton and Hove, stressed the 
‘threat to our individual freedom and the desperate efforts that must be made by all 
who hope to conserve the quality of life in this country and to ensure that we retain 
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the freedom of choice.’53 The emergence of choice doctrines is obvious in the debate 
around comprehensive education. This generated considerable anger. It was bad 
enough that middle-class financial differentials were under threat. Now their children 
were to be involved in a grand social experiment. It was, next to inflation and trade 
unionism, probably the most debated issue in Conservative politics. 
 On a general level members criticised what they perceived as  the influence of 
socialism in education. East Grinstead Conservatives called for ‘socialist influence in 
school’ to be countered.  A member complained about ‘too much Socialist influence in 
schools.’54 Part of this was provoked by comprehensivisation which they regarded as 
social engineering. The M.P Reginald Eyre argued that Conservatives strive for 
‘leveling up and not leveling down’. He wrote that the King Edward Grammar schools 
in Birmingham were ‘pacemakers throughout the country and we shall fight to 
preserve them.’55  A councillor in Birmingham complained that ‘whilst youngster’s 
pens, pencils and books are in short supply’, council workers were sent out ‘on 
special duty to paint out the word ‘grammar’ from the boards outside the schools.’ He 
adds angrily, ‘What an attitude of sheer hypocrisy’, ‘how typical of these arrogant 
people’.56 Although comprehensivisation was rolled out across the country, there was 
a high volume of grass-roots resistance. 
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 The Conservative response was ‘choice’. While reluctantly accepting the 
existence of comprehensive schools, the grass-roots  were keen to secure the 
survival of a range of schooling options  and to encourage parental ‘choice’. In fact 
they argued that the parents right to choose was a fundamental human right. In her 
maiden Conference speech Thatcher argued:
‘Freedom to choose is something we take for granted—until it is in danger of being taken away. 
Socialist governments set out perpetually to restrict the area of choice, Conservative governments 
to increase it. We believe that you become a responsible citizen by making decisions yourself, not 
by having them made for you. But they are made for you under Labour... Take education...’57
The debate on Education at the 1975 Conference did not condemn comprehensive 
schools  but called for ‘wider parental choice’. Rhodes Boyson, the M.P for Brent 
North, argued for ‘wider parental choice.’ ‘I  don’t mind’, he added, ‘there being neo-
Trotskyist teachers so long as they teach only the children of neo-Trotskyists.’58 
When in December 1975 a Bill was tabled that compelled dissenting local authorities 
to go comprehensive, the Conservative M.P for Beaconsfield, Ronald Bell, observed 
that ‘There is not a word in this Bill about parents or their freedom to choose’, 
pledging his resistance to ‘mean-minded and self-righteous dogmatism.’59  Within the 
grass-roots, Gravesend Conservatives  argued that parents should have choice over 
the type of school and which school their children should attend’ and called for ‘a 
variety of different school types’, ‘i.e Church schools, special schools, comprehensive 
schools, direct grant schools and grammar schools’. Brighton and Hove 
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Conservatives  called for ‘no extension of comprehensive schools’, and that 
comprehensive, grammar and direct grant schools should be maintained ‘so that 
after a reasonable interval an objective appraisal of their relative merits will be 
available.’60
 One battle that was lost but nonetheless demonstrates the enthusiasm for 
‘choice’, was  the phasing out of direct grant schools in the autumn of 1976. At the 
1975 party Conference, Norman St. John-Stevas, the Conservative spokesman for 
Education and Science, pledged to restore direct grant schools ‘to loud applause’ 
from the conference floor. He argued that the maintained schools were ‘not the 
preserve of the rich but of those of modest means, the thrifty and those prepared to 
make sacrifices for the education of their children.’ ‘That ladder of opportunity’, he 
added, ‘was to be knocked away by those who have not scrupled to make use of this 
system for themselves and their own children.’61  The underlying socio-economic 
interest of the Conservative party is evident here again. A motion put forward by 
North Bettersea, condemned ‘the doctrinaire attack by Labour on direct grant 
schools’. West Lewisham called for the conference to ‘deplore the loss of direct grant 
schools’, and Sutton Coldfield called on the next Conservative government to affirm 
the status of direct grant schools. At association level, Hove Conservatives 
expressed their support for the ‘continued existence of Direct Grant Schools.’62 
However, with defeat likely on the maintained front, Conservatives started to look 
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outside the State sector for options. East Grinstead Constituency council called for 
the encouragement of the private sector in education. One official called for the party 
to ‘encourage parents to educate children privately’. There was some support for 
Education Vouchers, and a committee was set-up under Rhodes Boyson to assess 
their practicalities. 
 The aim of Thatcherism was to create an economic environment where the 
individual could re-instate his (and increasingly her) differentials. The collective 
bargaining of the unskilled was dismantled, and those with skill, qualifications, or 
relevant experience would receive higher rewards not just in absolute but in relative 
terms.  
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Sir Ian Gilmour was correct to rail against the Thatcherite repudiation of post-war 
Conservatives. It implied, Gilmour argued, that Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Butler, 
Douglas-Home, Heath and Macleod ‘were all either grossly misguided or were not 
true Tories.’63  He concludes that neither implications are very plausible. However, 
Gilmour commits the same error in reverse by repudiating Thatcherism. The high 
political manoeuvre of Thatcher’s  election as party leader has allowed the idea that 
Thatcherism was more of a coup d'état than a genuine movement within 
Conservative politics.
 Gilmour argued that the ideological origins of Thatcherism lay in neo-
Liberalism. However, this assumption is  problematic. While the Thatcherites may 
have defended neo-Liberal positions, they were only a means to an end. Evans and 
Taylor argue that neo-Liberal ideology was a tool, ‘sometimes picked up to assist the 
policy-making process’, but ‘used in a fashion conditioned by the traditions of British 
Conservatism.’64 The aim was to effect a shift in the balance from the collective to the 
individual. Published in 1978, The Right Approach to the Economy states, ‘We have 
laid particular stress on the individual and his freedom in recent years  because 
Socialism has tipped the balance so far the other way.’65 Expressed in these terms 
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Thatcherism can be placed comfortably within the Tory tradition. R.J Bennett wrote 
that Conservatism ‘is a philosophy based upon a series of tensions: a dialectic of 
authority and freedom; collectivism and individualism; permanence and progress; 
past and present; continuity and change. It is  synthetic in nature; a philosophy of 
eclecticism, a theory of balance.’66 
 Moderation - the leitmotif of post-war Conservatism - was no longer sufficient. 
As Richard Law warned in 1950, the concern was that the party might be swept so 
far down the road of change that it would lose the ability to make a distinctive 
contribution to politics. Law argued that in the twentieth century all the Conservative 
party had to offer was ‘a reformulation of the fashions of the day.’67 Twenty-five years 
later Keith Joseph essentially made the same point. The ‘middle-ground’, where post-
war Conservatives had positioned themselves, was illusory, determined by points of 
reference that they had surrendered to the Left. 
 Consequently there were calls  for a re-statement of Conservative principles. 
One officer urged the party to ‘stick to basic principles and not to be ashamed of 
being a Conservative party.’68  One association observed a re-emphasis on ‘solid 
Conservative virtues’ within its membership.69 By Conservative principles  the grass-
roots  usually meant the rights  of the individual, self-sufficiency, and rewards for 
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success. As chapter two demonstrates, narrowing income differentials were a threat 
to these beliefs, intensified by the socio-economic base of the party. The clamour for 
a restatement of differentials was expressed in terms of ‘freedom’, especially 
economic freedom. 
 Libertarian works such as The Road to Serfdom by Fredrick Von Hayek, had 
been a steady influence on Conservatives since the end of the second world war. 
Maurice Cowling wrote that ‘Thatcher and her generation of Conservatives were 
sympathetic with the ‘anti-totalitarianism invented at that time by writers like Hayek, 
Popper, Talmon and Berlin.’70 Classical economists, particularly Adam Smith, were 
selectively evoked, and the concept of the ‘invisible hand’ resonated with 
Conservatives. One member argued that ‘The individual making his own decision en 
masse produces the best results.’71 Research by Mike Wilson underscores the point. 
On a range of issues, including public expenditure, taxation, nationalisation, trade 
unionism, property ownership, and the free market, the party rank-and-file spoke with 
a consistent Libertarian voice to the party leadership, although more consistent on 
some issues than on others.72  The reception of the 1970 manifesto and the 
disappointment that followed the Heath U-turns, indicates the strength of support for 
Libertarian positions. 
 This  underlay a wide-ranging assault on the collectivist practices and 
institutions of the post-war period.  The corporatist state was dismantled. By 1990 
88.
70 J. Fair, J. Hutchinson, ʻBritish Conservatism in the Twentieth Centuryʼ, in Albion, Vol.19, No.4 
(Winter 1987) p.569.
71 East Grinstead minutes, 30 April 1974.
72 M. Wilson, ʻGrass-roots Conservatismʼ, in The British Right, p.69.
forty state-owned concerns had been privatised. The National Economic 
Development Council lost influence and was finally wound up in 1992. Attempts to 
reach a settlement with the trade unions and industry to hold prices and incomes 
were abandoned. The trade unions, which relied on collective bargaining, had their 
legal immunities steadily eroded. The use of demand management to create 
conditions conducive to full employment was also abandoned and the recession of 
1980-1981 resulted in a sharp rise in unemployment. There was, instead, an 
emphasis on self-reliance and private gain. Those with useful skills or qualifications 
were strengthened, while those more dependent on collective systems were 
weakened. 
  The dynamic was the expanding middle class, or ‘Middle England’. In the 
private economy they included the salaried professions; business men, managers, 
and some of the skilled working class like engineers and technicians. There were 
also a good portion of public sector employees such as teachers, doctors, nurses, 
and senior administrators. These groups shared traits such as higher levels of 
education, particular skills  and qualifications, and a readiness to postpone material 
satisfaction for economic independence. After 1960 their ranks swelled as the portion 
of those employed as  manual workers or low-paid clerical ones went into rapid 
decline (from three quarters  in 1960 to about one quarter by the close of the century). 
Although various and fragmented, the new middle class shared the same hostility to 
post-war equality. In 1969 the Tory M.P Eldon Griffiths described the rise of the 
‘salariat class’ or ‘competitive man’. Their motives were more self-interested than 
social-democratic. ‘They expect’, Griffiths wrote, ‘to reap full, not a partial reward for 
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their efforts’, ‘bitterly resent’ high taxes, and ‘scornful of its identification with old-
fashioned trade unionism.’73 Avner Offer terms this process ‘The Great Transition’, 
where ‘attitudes began a slow shift away from common welfare ... towards private 
benefits.’74
 The new middle class had a profound impact on Conservative politics. First of 
all they were potential, if not natural Conservative voters, and registered their 
disaffection at by-elections  over three decades.  Consequently the party constructed 
an electoral appeal around them. Griffiths was not the only one to foresee an 
electoral opportunity in ‘Competitive Man’ who were ‘out of line with Socialism’ but 
had ‘by no means put down their roots in the Conservative party.’75 
 Secondly, the Conservative party itself was overwhelmingly drawn from the 
ranks of those ‘in the middle’, especially towards the lower end of the party 
organisation. They brought their own prejudices and interests into Conservative 
politics. Margaret Thatcher claimed to be one of them, hence an emphasis  on her 
biographical details after 1975.76  
 The socio-economic base of Thatcherism is clear in the consequences of the 
Thatcher government’s policies. They effected a large re-distribution of wealth away 
from manual workers towards the middle class, especially those possessing 
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managerial or professional qualifications. The Poll Tax proved one step too far, but 
the Thatcher governments  had already effected a sharp rise in inequality. The UK 
Gini coefficient rose from .25 to .35 in the 1980s where it has stayed ever since. 
According to Offer, no other advanced economy experienced such a sharp rise in 
inequality.77  However, given the level of concern for middle-class differentials in the 
1970s, this outcome is not surprising. The Thatcherites defended inequality as 
fundamental to freedom, and were assured by the general increase in national 
income.
 There was resistance. The ‘Wets’, as  they were dubbed, were appalled by the 
Thatcher government’s indifference to inequality. To fully grasp their principled 
opposition it has to be understood that they were of a different political generation. 
The Conservative party’s defeat at the 1945 general election was widely considered 
a delayed verdict on the ‘hungry thirties’. Reginald Maudling is a prime example. 
Maudling was elected to Parliament for Barnet in 1950, part of the ‘class of 1950’ 
which Green argues ‘had come into politics with the memory of the 1945 defeat still 
strong’.78  Having stood for and lost Heston and Isleworth in 1945, There was, 
Maudling observed, ‘a desire for change, a determination not to go back to the pre-
war days’, concluding that the Conservative party ‘must operate within a framework 
where change is  possible.’79  It was  on this  premise that post-war Conservatives 
accepted many of the underlying assumptions of the post-war settlement.  They may 
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have been ‘emasculated’ by the 1945 result, but to risk paraphrasing an eminent 
historian, they lived through these times and we did not.
 Consequently, they read the socio-economic change of the post-war period 
and its implications for the Conservative party differently to the Thatcherites. 
Maudling’s response to the Orpington by-election is revealing. He wrote that 
Orpington indicated ‘the close of one political era and the opening of another.’ 
However the explanation he put forward was the lack of purpose in ‘affluent society’. 
‘The boredom of modern life in comfortable suburbia’ required leadership. The time 
for ‘breaking away from austerity and the meshes of Socialism’ had come and 
gone.80 Later Conservatives, from the ‘class of 1959’ onwards, had a very different 
view. Life in suburbia was not as comfortable as Maudling seemed to think or as the 
middle-class revolt indicated. 
 Steadily the class of 1950 declined in numbers. By 1966 only eleven 
Conservative M.Ps had been in place since before 1945. By 1974 only half had been 
elected before 1964, and most of these were of the 1959 class. To reinforce the shift 
in power, economic and demographic change increased the representation of 
southern, ‘white-collar’ workers on the Tory benches. And so the commitment to the 
post-war settlement was being progressively weakened. Consequently, those who 
remained committed were a declining number. It is important to stop short of 
deducing from these forces  that Thatcherism was  inevitable, however, it was the 
likely outcome.
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 Thatcherism could not have happened within a democratic organisation like 
the Conservative party without consent. According to Green, ‘In the mid-1970s the 
Conservative party, at both the parliamentary and grass-roots level, was looking for 
and found a leader in tune with their long-held aspirations.’81 Some of the research 
put forward here lends support to this view. For example, shortly after her election as 
party leader, Worthing members ‘detected a more positive approach and one which 
was in keeping with their own desires’.82
 Thatcher certainly tried to appeal to the party faithful in a way that previous 
leaders had not. Wilson argues that ‘she set out to identify positively herself with the 
constituency rank-and-file.’ In 1975 Thatcher argued that ‘Politicians must work at 
every problem from the grass-roots.’83  Nigel Lawson recalls  the rapport between 
Thatcher and the party rank-and-file:
‘Harold Macmillan had a contempt for the party. Alec Home tolerated it, Ted Heath loathed it. 
Margaret Thatcher genuinely liked it. She felt a communion with it, one which later expanded to 
embrace the silent majority of the British people as a whole.’84
 However, in their 1992 survey of the party membership, Whitely, Seyd and 
Richardson, conclude that ‘in many respects the grass-roots Conservative party is 
rather anti-Thatcherite.’ They found ‘a lot of support for ‘One Nation’ Tory policies  like 
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incomes policy, regulation of markets, and social welfare spending.’85 On these and 
other issues  the rank-and-file appear to diverge with the Thatcherites, though only if 
one accepts the author’s definition of Thatcherism. In fact, on many issues that we 
know to be central to Thatcherism, such as privatisation, industrial relations reform, 
income tax cuts, private education, and internal markets, there is considerable grass-
roots support. 
 However, if we assume that the grass-roots were anti-Thatcherite in the early 
1990s, it is, as the authors concede, difficult to assess grass-roots opinion prior to 
1979 without historical data. The research put forward in this  thesis, would suggest 
that there was significant support for the policies of the Thatcher government. For 
example, support for incomes policies were only tolerated in so far as they held out 
the possibility of reducing inflation. When they failed, and pay policies began to work 
against the economic interests of the party’s core constituency, they were largely 
rejected.
 
 Contemporaries often view Thatcherism as a radical departure from post-war 
Conservatism, and there was significant flux in the 1970s over a range of policy 
issues. However, looked at from a historical perspective, it was the culmination of an 
evolution. As Lord Blake argued, ‘leaders do not operate in a vacuum.’86  Economic 
and social forces were at work.   The positions that we now know as ‘Thatcherite’ 
were already being defended by Conservatives.  By the 1970s, events  worked in 
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their direction and the election of a leader from the Conservative Right tipped the 
balance dramatically in their favour. Underlining the evolutionary rather than the 
revolutionary nature of Thatcherism, the Conservative party remained, to borrow 
Ewen Green’s terminology, ‘recognisably’ Conservative. In his  sweeping history of 
the conservative party from Peel to Major Lord Blake concluded:
‘A Conservative Rip Van Winkle of 1955 looking at the party forty years later would see many basic 
continuities: the same sceptical  attitudes towards ‘equality’, the efficacy of government, the wisdom 
of Whitehall, long-term planning, Utopian Panaceas, international  idealism, the goodness of human 
nature. On the other side of the coin he or she would find the same belief in the continuity of 
institutions and traditions, in freedom of the individual, in national unity, in ‘Britain first’.’87
Blake was right. Perhaps like Orwell’s  England, the Conservative party will always 
stay the Conservative party, ‘having the power to change out of recognition and yet 
remain the same.’88
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